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I. INTRODUCTION
Why do states seek to agree on maritime boundaries? Three
typical situations might be distinguished in this regard:
* substantial activities subject to coastal state jurisdiction are
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being conducted or are likely to be conducted in an area of
actual or potential dispute;
one or both states wish to stimulate uses, particularly fixed
uses, of the area in question;
there is no significant activity or interest in the area requir-
ing a boundary.
A. Substantial Activities Being Conducted
The first situation arises where substantial activities subject
to coastal state jurisdiction are being conducted or are likely to
be conducted in an area of actual or potential dispute. In this
case, if either or both states attempt to enforce their jurisdiction,
particularly against each other's nationals or licensees, there is
a risk of serious escalation of the dispute. The consequences
might include a decline in useful economic activity, inability to
apply meaningful environmental or economic regulations, politi-
cal animosity extending beyond those persons whose livelihoods
are affected, private violence, or demands for escort with the
attendant risk of direct confrontations between the armed forces
of the two states.
The transfer of control over vast high seas fisheries to coast-
al states by virtue of extensions of fisheries jurisdiction to 200
nautical miles presents the typical case. Once jurisdiction is
extended, both coastal and distant-water fishermen who visited
the area yesterday (and perhaps many yesterdays) need to know
where they may fish tomorrow. The basic choices governments
have for avoiding confrontation arising from overlapping claims
are explicit or tacit agreement on a permanent or interim bound-
ary, explicit or tacit joint management within a defined area,
explicit or tacit agreement on mutual restraint with respect to
the exercise of jurisdiction over at least each other's nationals
within a defined area, or unreciprocated unilateral restraint.'
This probably explains the reasons for a significant number
of delimitation agreements concluded after one or both states
extended jurisdiction over fisheries to 200 miles, in most cases
1. Absent express or tacit agreement on geographic limits roughly defining the
disputed area, the "defined area" for joint management or mutual restraint might
encompass areas extending well beyond those likely to be in dispute, potentially
embracing the full economic zones of both parties.
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during or following the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea.2 From this perspective, the delimitation agree-
ment can be seen as a response to a need to agree on something
and an inability or unwillingness to rely on restraint or tacit
arrangements at least over the long term.
In almost all cases, the agreement also reflects a preference
for a unilateral rather than joint management regime in princi-
ple, notwithstanding the practical need for joint arrangements to
conserve and manage migrating fish stocks and transboundary
ecosystems and the probable transboundary effort patterns of
fishermen. The overwhelming majority of states has responded
to the fisheries problem with defined geographic boundaries. No
state appears to have entrusted a court or arbitral tribunal in a
delimitation dispute with the authority to impose biologically
and economically inspired fisheries management and allocation
arrangements as part of a boundary regime in lieu of or in addi-
tion to a fixed boundary.
This suggests the continuing influence of the dominant
political and legal approach to formal accommodation of states'
competing claims to use and control on land: geographic parti-
tion with fixed, preferably precisely defined, geographic bound-
aries. To put it differently, while the extension of coastal state
jurisdiction over fisheries places a mobile resource exploited by
mobile vessels under the potential control of more than one
state, the choice of a geographic boundary as the preferred for-
mal means for accommodating and partitioning the respective
interests, even where that boundary divides single stocks, eco-
systems and effort patterns, may well reflect the dominance of
political factors and legal habits over ostensibly dominant con-
servation and economic concerns.3
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter U.N. Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea]. For example, Mexico wished to settle its maritime
boundary with Cuba prior to the effective date of its decree establishing an exclusive
economic zone that extended its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. See Agreement
Concerning the Delimitation of Sea Space, July 26, 1976, Cuba-Mex., Limits in the
Seas, No. 104 (1985). The relatively rapid agreement between the United States and
Cuba may be due in part to the fact that a dispute over fisheries enforcement could
have been quite nasty, particularly if it involved Cuban exiles residing in Florida.
See Maritime Boundary Agreement, Dec. 16, 1977, U.S.-Cuba, S. Exec. Doc. H., 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) [hereinafter U.S.-Cuba Maritime Agreement].
3. The history of the Gulf of Maine adjudication is instructive. Two agree-
[Vol. 26:2
1994-951 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 247
Apologists for this system may argue that after, or at least
in connection with, agreement on the boundary it becomes easier
to address the problem of mutual cooperation in management in
a formal manner. They might point to the Australia-Papua New
Guinea agreement with respect to fisheries.4 They might also
point to the practice of arriving at unitization agreements where
a fluid nonliving resource such as an oil or gas deposit is tra-
versed by a political boundary or concession limit.
B. Desire to Stimulate Uses
The second situation prompting a delimitation agreement
arises where one or both states wish to stimulate uses, particu-
larly fixed uses, of the area in question. The classic example
would be exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf for
oil and gas, preceded perhaps by prospecting or scientific re-
search. The organization of the oil and gas industry generally
assumes an exclusive legal right to extract the resources of an
area with respect to which major site-specific investments are to
be made.' A dispute between neighboring states over the area
casts doubt on that right.
As compared with fishing, exploitation of seabed hydrocar-
bons is a relatively recent development. By the middle of the
Twentieth century, virtually all of the world's seabed hydrocar-
bons were still unexplored and unexploited. There was plenty of
room for the new industry outside boundary regions. The rapid
emulation by other states of the Truman Proclamation's claim to
the continental shelf' did not pose an immediate practical need
ments were presented to the United States Senate. One submitted the question of a
single maritime boundary to a Chamber of the International Court of Justice. The
second dealt with fisheries, moderating the effect of an adjudicated boundary on the
fishing interests of the parties. The Senate approved the first but not the second
agreement. The first agreement was not amended to permit the Chamber to impose
measures to moderate the effect of the boundary on fisheries' interests and the par-
ties did not commit themselves to do so before the Chamber. However, Canada de-
scribed the general bilateral fisheries management relationship between the parties
in glowing terms. It should surprise no one that the line drawn by the Chamber
appears in effect to be sensitive to certain fisheries' allocation problems.
4. Treaty Concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area
Known as Torres Strait, Dec. 18, 1978, Austl.-Papua N.G., 1978 Austl. T.S. No. 4
[hereinafter Australia-Papua New Guinea Treaty].
5. Indeed, it would seem that this need for exclusivity was a major driving
force behind the formulation of the legal doctrine of the continental shelf.
6. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
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for delimitation agreements in most areas. Not surprisingly, this
need was first perceived in oil-rich shallow semi-enclosed seas
such as the Persian Gulf.
While the lure of potential seabed riches has a significant
political impact on governments, it would appear that potential
boundary disputes with respect to the seabed are more manage-
able than fisheries disputes, and pose less of a political risk of
escalation. Governments that wish to avoid provoking their
neighbors may refrain from taking affirmative actions necessary
to authorize oil and gas activities, or may make them subject to
future boundary arrangements.7 Legal uncertainty will itself
have some restraining effect on the oil and gas investor, typical-
ly a transnational company with substantial alternatives for in-
vestment.
Put simply, in the case of oil and gas, it will usually take
some affirmative governmental action to trigger an escalation.
In the case of fisheries, the fishermen may well force the issue.
This is particularly so because those with the fewest alternative
economic options are likely to be the coastal fishermen of the
states concerned and the coastal communities they help support.
This is not to suggest that governments are unmoved by the
risk of an escalating dispute in seeking to agree on seabed
boundaries in areas of potential economic interest. The fear of
an unfavorable status quo and the desire to achieve a favorable
status quo are omnipresent in politics and diplomacy. Govern-
ments are under constant pressure to take potentially provoca-
tive actions designed to reinforce their claims. Lawyers trained
in the influence of history and possession upon legal rights and
in doctrines of estoppel may themselves add to this pressure.
Taken together, the opinions of the Court in the Eastern Green-
land,' Temple of Preah Vihear,9 and Tunisia-Libya Continental
7. In theory, the coastal state's rights with respect to the continental shelf
including commercial prospecting and scientific research should accelerate the pres-
sure for reaching a boundary agreement. These activities, however, are conducted
from ships over broad areas and generally do not require economic exclusivity. To
some degree, satellite data obviates the need for on-site observation. Thus, either
neglect or mutual restraint can postpone the pressure to agree on precise delimita-
tion.
8. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B)
No. 53 (April 5).
9. Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6
248 [Vol. 26:2
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Shelf" cases may have some unforeseen, arguably unjustified,
but nevertheless unsettling effects in this regard.
The argument for a fixed boundary as opposed to a joint
management arrangement may be stronger in the case of fixed
uses such as oil and gas development than in the case of fish-
eries. The resource is not mobile. The exploitation activity is not
mobile. Judge Jessup's observation in the North Sea Continental
Shelf cases1 that the real issue in continental shelf delimita-
tion is allocation of valuable resource deposits seems not to have
stimulated very much interest in joint management regimes. It
is also not clear that the imposition of a direct joint manage-
ment system on a disputed field or resource deposit is the best
way to stimulate new investment or manage the resource. Some
joint arrangements provide for geographic division of manage-
ment authority between the states concerned.
The environmental effects of oil and gas development, how-
ever, are not necessarily localized. Pollution in a boundary re-
gion may affect several coastal states. While the United States
made some arguments in this regard in support of its position
concerning the location of the maritime boundary in the Gulf of
Maine, 2 as in the case of fisheries there appears as yet to be
no significant tendency to deviate for environmental reasons
from the political tradition of a fixed boundary, except perhaps
in the unusually sophisticated agreement between Australia and
Papua New Guinea.13
C. No Significant Activity or Interest
The third situation is perhaps the most intriguing. It arises
when governments seek to agree on a maritime boundary de-
spite the absence of significant activity or interest in the region
requiring a boundary.
(June 15).
10. Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982
I.C.J. 18 (June 24) [hereinafter Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case].
11. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (separate opin-
ion of Jessup, J.); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (sepa-
rate opinion of Jessup, J.) [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf Cases].
12. Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area, Oct. 12, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1197.
13. See supra note 4, at 4.
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In this regard one might bear in mind that, with the notable
exception of areas where the land boundary divides a navigable
river at its mouth or an otherwise important navigation channel
or route is involved, navigation and overflight are activities that
do not normally require a precise determination of which state
has jurisdiction in a particular area, especially when that area is
beyond the territorial sea. Freedom of navigation and overflight
beyond twelve miles from the coast is generally respected. Even
within the territorial sea, ships of all states enjoy a right of
innocent passage. Ships and aircraft are frequently able to avoid
disputed boundary regions close to shore. It would appear that
extended coastal state jurisdiction over pollution from ships at
sea is too new (and the potential source of pollution too transito-
ry) to generate much pressure for a maritime boundary for pol-
lution regulation purposes.
If there is no significant activity requiring a boundary, why
do governments negotiate boundaries in such circumstances?
A possible answer can be found in the desire to avoid poten-
tial disputes in the future where there are now none. 4 It is
unclear whether this objective, in and of itself, often explains
the behavior of governments. It is nevertheless likely to influ-
ence lawyers, and lawyers are likely to influence maritime
boundary policy.
There may also be something special about boundaries that
strengthens the desire to settle them even in the absence of a
significant problem. Biologists might point out that some other
mammals mark their territory, and that this marking has the
effect of controlling disputes. Scope of jurisdiction lies at the
heart of administrative law. Bureaucracies are preoccupied with
jurisdictional limits. There is an almost palpable desire to dem-
onstrate clearly (in this case, on a map) where power and re-
sponsibility do, and do not, exist.
Thus, it is not surprising to discover that some governments
have embarked on a general program for the purpose of settling
maritime boundaries in areas of extended maritime jurisdiction.
14. Canada and Denmark are said to have been motivated by the desire to
avoid future disputes in a largely unsettled area where Greenland faces the Canadi-
an Arctic. See Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf be-
tween Greenland and Canada, Mar. 13, 1974, Den.-Can., 950 U.N.T.S. 147.
[Vol. 26:2250
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Such a program is most evident in the case of states that must
negotiate boundaries with a significant number of other states.
Colombia, France, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, and the Unit-
ed States are among the examples.
When one examines these examples, one is struck by the
amount of activity related to islands and dependencies located at
some considerable distance from the continental mainland or
main islands. The United States has concluded a substantial
number of maritime boundary agreements with respect to its is-
lands in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, but has yet to
agree on three of its four extended maritime boundaries with
Canada or its boundary with the Bahamas. Colombia's boundary
dispute with Venezuela remains unresolved.
The most obvious explanation is that it is easiest to reach
agreement in the case of small islands surrounded by the deep
waters of the Caribbean Sea or the Pacific Ocean where the
boundary regions are unlikely to contain hydrocarbons or local-
ized fisheries." While the interest of small Pacific island states
in regulating foreign tuna fleets may explain some of their inter-
est in maritime boundaries, the highly migratory patterns of
tuna greatly reduce the significance of the location of any partic-
ular boundary. There is little to inspire attempts to deviate
significantly from equidistance in areas between small islands of
comparable size where few if any resources are at stake.
There may however be other political factors at work. One
possible implication of a maritime boundary agreement is recog-
nition of the right of the state party to the agreement to con-
clude the agreement on behalf of the land territory from which
the maritime jurisdiction extends.'" The studies of Colombia's
15. Not much is known about commercial concentrations of high grade manga-
nese modules in most places, not to mention subsurface hard mineral deposits. In
light of factors such as alternative sources of supply, market demand and cost of
extraction, their present economic value, if any, is not regarded as great.
16. Delimitation negotiations between Australia and the Solomon Islands began
within three months of Solomon independence. See Agreement Establishing Certain
Sea and Sea-bed Boundaries, Sept. 13, 1988, Austl.-Solom. Is., 12 LOS Bull. 19
(1988). The delimitation agreement between Bahrain and Iran was concluded shortly
after Iran abandoned its claim to Bahrain. See Agreement Concerning Delimitation
of the Continental Shelf, June 17, 1971, Iran-Bahr., 826 U.N.T.S. 227. The boundary
studies dealing with the Baltic Sea and the former German Democratic Republic
suggest that the GDR may have seen maritime boundary agreements as reinforcing
its position as a sovereign independent state. Especially in light of the long period
of non-recognition of the GDR by the Federal Republic of Germany and other
252 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:2
attempts to negotiate maritime boundaries in the Western Ca-
ribbean suggest a close link between these efforts and
Colombia's dispute with Nicaragua over sovereignty with respect
to the islands in question. One assumes Indonesia was not un-
aware of the political implications of a delimitation agreement
with Australia dealing with the so-called Timor Gap in light of
the controversy surrounding Indonesia's annexation of the for-
mer Portuguese colony."
It is possible that extra-regional metropolitan powers are
particularly interested in reinforcing the recognition of their
territorial role in a region even in the absence of a specific terri-
torial dispute," bearing in mind that a potential boundary dis-
pute in the future might be more difficult to resolve if the issue
of the right to represent the territory in question was raised in
that context. Conversely, a state may wish to provide a depen-
dency with established maritime boundaries as a prelude to
independence in order to protect the interests of the inhabitants
and minimize foreign policy problems for the newly independent
state. 9
Western states prior to the pursuit of the so-called Ostpolitik of the Federal Repub-
lic in the early 1970s. The delimitation agreement between the GDR and the FRG is
considered a direct result of ditente between the parties. See Protocol Note between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic Concerning
the Boundary in Lfibeck Bay, Oct. 1, 1974, F.R.G.-G.D.R., G B1. I, 438 (1974)
(G.D.R.) [hereinafter F.R.G.-G.D.R. Protocol Note].
17. These considerations apparently were not sufficient to persuade Indonesia to
yield to Australia, in respect of Timor, as much as it had yielded geographically
years earlier in respect of other areas. However, it may explain Indonesian willing-
ness to accept a joint management arrangement as the basis of the settlement on
the Australian side of the Timor Trough. See Treaty on Zone of Cooperation in an
Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, Dec.
11, 1989, Indon.-Austl., 29 I.L.M. 475. On the other hand, Indonesia yielded even
less in geographic terms in the provisional fisheries delimitation agreement in which
Timor was not as prominent an issue. See Memorandum of Understanding Concern-
ing the Implementation of a Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Ar-
rangement, Oct. 29, 1981, Austl.-Indon. (on file with Dep't of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, Canberra, Australia) [hereinafter Provisional Fisheries Surveillance].
18. It is curious that the text of the boundary agreement between France and
Saint Lucia does not refer to Martinique, the French island concerned. See Delimita-
tion Convention, Mar. 4, 1981, Fr.-St. Lucia, I Can. Annex. 675 (1983).
19. For example, the United Kingdom sought to establish offshore boundaries
among the Trucial States while it was still responsible for their foreign affairs.
Sharjah and Umm al Qaywayn accepted. See Seabed Boundary Agreement, 1964,
Sharjah-Umm al Qaywayn, I Can. Annex 99 (1983); see also Orders in Council, Sept.
11, 1958, Sarawak-North Boreo-Brunei, U.K. Stat. Inst. (Nos. 1517-18), describing a
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In a similar vein, one possible way to obtain or enhance
recognition of baselines is to enter into a delimitation agreement
based on equidistance in which the boundary is clearly mea-
sured from those baselines.20 This factor might influence
archipelagic states such as Indonesia.21 Although the difference
is not always easy to establish, this situation should be distin-
guished from one in which the primary purpose of the baselines
is to influence the maritime boundary negotiations.
A related factor is the desire to "consolidate" coastal state
jurisdiction newly acquired under international law.22 This ap-
1958 United Kingdom line drawn with respect to North Borneo and Sarawak and
Brunei. Australia, on behalf of Papua New Guinea, settled the land boundary and
completed a missing segment of the maritime boundary with Indonesia in contempla-
tion of New Guinea's scheduled independence in 1975. See Agreements between Aus-
tralia and Indonesia Concerning Certain Boundaries between Papua New Guinea and
Indonesia, Feb. 12, 1973, Papua N.G.-Indon., 975 U.N.T.S. 4 [hereinafter Australia-
Indonesia Certain Boundaries Agreements].
20. As a strictly legal matter, absent more specific references in the agreement,
an equidistant line measured from a baseline does not necessarily imply recognition
of the baseline as such, but merely acknowledgement that the claimed baseline rep-
resents an appropriate point of departure for applying equidistance principles (for ex-
ample, a construction line representing the general direction of the coast). Of course,
regardless of the effect of the claim on the boundary, a state may obtain recognition
of its claim in connection with the boundary agreement. Panama obtained recogni-
tion of its claim that the Gulf of Panama is historic waters in its boundary
agreements with Colombia and Costa Rica; only in the former case did the baseline
affect the delimitation. See Treaty on the Delimitation of Marine and Submarine
Areas and Associated Matters, Nov. 20, 1976, Pan.-Colom., I Can. Annex. 417 (1983)
[hereinafter Panama-Colombia Treaty]; see also Agreement Relating to the Delimita-
tion of their Marine and Submarine Areas in the Pacific Ocean and to their Mari-
time Cooperation, Apr. 6, 1984, Colom.-Costa Rica, Diario Oficial de Colom. (June
18, 1985). There is speculation that North Korea may have obtained Soviet recogni-
tion of its unusually long 300-mile baseline in exchange for a maritime boundary
favorable to the Soviet Union. See Agreement on the Delimitation of the Soviet-Kore-
an National Border, Apr. 17, 1985, U.S.S.R.-Korea [hereinafter Soviet-Korea National
Border Agreement], reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 1135 (Jona-
than I. Charney & Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1993).
21. It is interesting that the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Sin-
gapore, which generally follows the deep draught tanker route, moves within the
Indonesia archipelagic baselines at one point. See Agreement Stipulating the Ter-
riterial Sea Boundary Lines in the Strait of Singapore, May 25, 1973, Indon.-Sing.,
Limits in the Seas, No. 60 (1974) [hereinafter Indonesia-Singapore Sea Boundary
Agreement].
22. In some sense, it would appear to reflect a feeling that the existence of the
close is tentative or inchoate until it is actually enclosed and precisely separated
from the neighboring close. One way to identify a thing is to describe its perimeter
(a circle for example). Perhaps looming in the background is Grotius' (in this context
disconcerting) observation that because the vagrant waters of the sea cannot be
enclosed they are necessarily free. The U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea did
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:2
pears to be particularly true in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas
where the peaceful enjoyment of extended maritime jurisdiction
is especially dependent upon arrangements with one's neigh-
bors."3 The series of British and other delimitation agreements
in the North Sea followed immediately upon the entry into force
of the Continental Shelf Convention on 10 June 1964, designed
in part to consolidate the conventional regime in the North
Sea.24 A similar process occurred in the Caribbean Sea with
respect to the exclusive economic zone. A desire to consolidate
200-nautical-mile limits is identified as one reason for the delim-
itation agreement between Denmark and Norway.25
The decision to conclude a maritime boundary agreement
may be influenced by political factors extraneous to the bound-
ary itself. The objective need for agreement, particularly where
relations are already strained, may become a convenient basis
for governments to take tentative steps toward improving their
relations. One notes, for example, that the United States negoti-
ated a maritime boundary agreement with Cuba at a time when
broader attempts were being made to improve bilateral rela-
tions.26
not pursue a United States proposal to establish coastal state jurisdiction over fish-
ing for stocks that reside in coastal areas beyond the territorial sea without fixing
distance limits.
23. It is interesting to note that many states, while implementing the continen-
tal shelf doctrine and delimiting their respective continental shelves in the area,
have thus far refrained from implementing exclusive economic zones or 200-mile
fisheries zones in the Mediterranean Sea, even when the same states have asserted
such jurisdiction outside the Mediterranean Sea.
24. This point is made in a number of North Sea boundary studies, especially
Netherlands-United Kingdom (1965). See Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf under the North Sea, Together with Amending Protocol, Oct.
6, 1965, Neth.-U.K., 595 U.N.T.S. 105. For the states concerned, the consolidation of
the regime of the Continental Shelf Convention in the North Sea included not only
the principles and rules of coastal state jurisdiction, but the delimitation rules set
forth in Article 6. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter Convention on the Continental
Shelf].
25. See Agreement Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the
North Sea/Norwegian Sea and Establishing the Boundary between the Faroes Fish-
ing Zone and the Norwegian Economic Zone, June 15, 1979, Den.-Nor., I Can. Annex
603 (1983).
26. Because of strained political relations between the parties, the U.S. Senate
has yet to approve the treaty. Provisional application has been renewed periodically
by the parties. See U.S.-Cuba Maritime Agreement, supra note 2.
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II. POLITICAL FACTORS
A. Introduction
Four important political decisions can be identified in con-
nection with maritime boundaries: the decision to negotiate, the
decision to propose a particular boundary, 7 the decision to
make concessions with a view to reaching agreement, 28 and the
decision to agree on a particular boundary. Even the decision to
respect a tribunal's legally binding determination of a boundary
is political.
The study of factors potentially influencing the location of
maritime boundaries is a study of the influence of these differ-
ent factors on the ultimate political decisions of governments.
Unless it influences the decisions of those with political authori-
ty, any given factor is irrelevant to a particular boundary. The
"objective" importance of any given factor - assuming such a
thing could be measured - does not necessarily explain its polit-
ical impact.2"
When a tribunal is asked to decide a dispute regarding a
maritime boundary under international law, the tribunal will
limit itself to examining factors it regards as legally relevant to
27. Some states have announced a public position related to the location of the
boundary prior to negotiation, whether for tactical or political reasons or because of
the need to define some (temporary) geographic limit on domestic regulatory or en-
forcement actions.
28. The temporal relationship among the first three decisions involves complex
questions of subjective intent, information regarding the other side's attitudes, man-
agement of domestic political pressures, and negotiating strategy and style. Some
seasoned negotiators would argue that, once sufficient information is available re-
garding the other party's interests, the best approach to reaching agreement is to
collapse the second and third decisions into one "reasonable" position around which
one is prepared to negotiate at the margins but from which one is not prepared to
retreat in principle. They would presumably regard as unfortunate the possible im-
plication in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases that this approach might not
satisfy the duty to negotiate in good faith. The International Court of Justice noted
that the parties "are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotia-
tions are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon
its own position without contemplating any modification of it." North Sea Continen-
tal Shelf Cases, supra note 11, T 85.
29. For example, the ocean policies of a major industrialized maritime state
with global economic and strategic interests like the United States can be substan-
tially influenced by local coastal fishing industries that represent a very small pro-
portion of its economy.
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the resolution of the issues in dispute. Much has been written
about the rich and growing jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice and other tribunals in this connection. However
flexible the articulated legal standard of "equitable principles,"
"relevant circumstances," and "equitable results" may be, there
can be no doubt that while the parties are free to take into ac-
count virtually anything they wish in fashioning their negotiat-
ing positions, a tribunal asked to apply international law is
more limited.
The law of maritime delimitation may require the parties to
negotiate in good faith. But it places few if any limitations on
the location of an agreed boundary or related arrangements.
Provided they agree, the parties are largely free to divide as
they wish control over areas and activities subject to their juris-
diction under international law. They may be guided principally,
in some measure, or not at all by legal principles and legally
relevant factors a court might examine, and by a host of other
factors a tribunal might well ignore such as relative power and
wealth, the state of their relations, security and foreign policy
objectives, convenience, and concessions unrelated to the bound-
ary or even to maritime jurisdiction as such. °
From this perspective, it is difficult and arguably misleading
to isolate political from other factors when analyzing agreed
boundaries. Yet it would make little sense even to attempt to
replicate here what is so ably presented by other authors else-
where in this field of study.
This being said, it should be noted that maritime boundary
issues do not normally seem to engage the-same level of political
attention as many disputes over land territory. The resultant
agreements are often viewed as economic or technical. Indeed, it
can be argued that few maritime boundary agreements are re-
garded as overwhelmingly political, with the notable exception of
the agreement between Argentina and Chile."1
30. It is said that Italy settled for less than full effect for its islands in ex-
change for a wider package on various political and economic questions, including
Italian fishing in exchange for one billion lire per year. See Agreement Relating to
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Aug. 20, 1971, Italy-Tunis., I Can. Annex
(1983).
31. The agreement followed the Beagle Channel Arbitration, Argentina's refec-
tion of the result, fears of armed conflict, and mediation by the Vatican. Its title is
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In addition to the difficulty of isolating political consider-
ations from other considerations affecting maritime boundaries,
one must add the difficulty of accumulating relevant data on
political factors. Virtually every boundary agreement is de-
scribed, often in its preamble, as designed to foster good rela-
tions between the parties. 2 Yet governments may be reluctant
to state publicly that for reasons of good relations they accepted
a less favorable boundary than they might otherwise have ob-
tained.33 Governments could almost never be expected to assert
that they received more because they had greater overall lever-
age in the bilateral relationship.'
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Maritime Delimitation. The treaty was submitted to
a plebiscite in Argentina. Agreement between the Government of Argentina and the
Government of Chile Relating to the Maritime Delimitation between Argentina and
Chile, Nov. 29, 1984, Arg.-Chile, 24 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter Argentina-Chile Agreement].
32. It might be noted that maritime boundary lines are frequently simplified by
reducing the number of turning points, using a long line perpendicular to the gener-
al direction of the coast, or in other ways. The primary reason is to simplify com-
pliance and enforcement. In order to avoid problems with inadvertent violations by
fishermen, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru agreed to permit the neighboring state's nation-
al to fish in a ten-mile zone on either side of the maritime boundary beyond twelve
miles from the coast. Agreement between the Government of Chile and the Govern-
ment of Peru Relating to the Maritime Boundary between Chile and Peru, Aug. 18,
1952, Chile-Peru, Limits in the Seas, No. 86 (1979) [hereinafter Chile-Peru Agree-
ment]; Agreement between the Government of Ecuador Relating to the Maritime
Boundary between Peru and Ecuador, Aug. 22, 1985, Peru-Ecuador, Limits in the
Seas, No. 88 (1979) [hereinafter Peru-Ecuador Agreement].
33. There are exceptions. The rapporteur of the France-Monaco treaty is quoted
as stating to the French Senate, "Because of the close and exceptional nature of
French-Mondgasque relations, France has accepted provisions that the rules of inter-
national law did not oblige it to accept." The reference was to the Mondgasque rela-
tions, France has accepted provisions that the rules of international law did not
oblige it to accept. The reference was to the Mon~gasque corridor leading out into
the Mediterranean in a shore. See Maritime Delimitation Agreement between Monaco
and France, Feb. 16, 1984, Fr.-Monaco, No. 8-3, J.O. 6 July 1985, p. 11,600 (French)
[hereinafter Monaco-France Delimitation Agreement]. Some readers of the opinions in
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, supra note 11, and the Guinea-Guinea-Bissau
arbitration might question the statement. Award of 14 February 1985 of the Arbi-
tration Tribunal for the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and
Guinea-Bissau, 25 I.L.M. 252 (English translation of official French text) [hereinafter
Guinea-Guinea-Bissau Award]. Senegal was no less generous to The Gambia. See
Agreement between The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal, June 4, 1975, Gam.-
Senegal, Limits in the Seas, No. 85 (1979) [hereinafter Gambia-Senegal Agreement].
Norway may have accepted a result that gave Iceland all of its 200-mile zone in
part because Iceland is highly dependent on fishing. See Agreements between Iceland
and Norway Establishing Maritime Boundaries between Iceland and Jan Mayen (1)
Agreement Concerning Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions, May 28, 1980, Ice.-
Nor., Official Gazette C9/1980 [hereinafter Iceland-Norway Agreement].
34. Two authors suggest that the relative strength of the parties was a factor
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B. Related Accommodations
A further analytical difficulty relates to the question of
when a factor is deemed to have influenced the location of the
boundary. The easy case is one in which the actual location of
the boundary represents the accommodation of the interest con-
cerned, for example where a boundary follows a navigation chan-
nel. A more difficult problem arises when the interest of a state
is accommodated not by adjusting the position of the boundary,
but by concurrent agreement that imposes an obligation on the
other state with respect to areas on the latter's side of the
boundary.
It seems reasonable to assume that in such cases the inter-
est did indeed influence the location of the boundary in the
sense that agreement might not have been reached on such a
boundary absent the related accommodation. For example, a
state concerned about navigation rights in a channel that is
closer to its neighbor's coast than its own might prefer to use the
channel as the boundary, but might in some circumstances settle
for an equidistant line boundary in exchange for treaty guaran-
tees of free navigation. That same state presumably would resist
an equidistant line boundary absent related navigation guaran-
tees.
The relationship between boundaries and related accommo-
dations is sometimes overlooked in analyses of maritime bound-
ary law because it does not form part of the formal jurispru-
dence. The reason for this is that the International Court of
Justice and arbitral tribunals have not been asked by the par-
ties to fashion a broader boundary region regime that accommo-
in determining the location of the line. Its perception of Indian power may have
influenced the Maldives government not to argue that Minicoy Island should be giv-
en reduced effect. See Agreement between India and Maldives on Maritime Boundary
in the Arabian Sea and Related Matters, Dec. 28, 1976, India-Maldives, Limits in
the Seas, No. 78 (1978) [hereinafter India-Maldives Maritime Agreement]. The de-
limitation line in the Bay of Biscay, more favorable to France than an equidistant
line, was concluded at a time when Spain, under Franco, may have been in a some-
what weaker position diplomatically. See Conventions between France and Spain (1)
Concerning the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and (2) Con-
cerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf of the Bay of Biscay, Jan. 25,
1974, Fr.-Spain, (U.N. Legislative Series) U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER/B/19, 395
(1980) (France-Spain).
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dates their interests. Determining the location of a maritime
boundary has generally been the sole means at the disposal of
judges and arbitrators for accommodating relevant interest. 5
C. Effect of Political Factors
It is often difficult to discern what, if any, effect political
considerations had on the location of an agreed maritime bound-
ary.36 A state's desire to maximize the areas subject to its juris-
diction and its interest in achieving agreement on a maritime
boundary may well conflict. It stands to reason that if dispute
avoidance is a primary purpose for seeking agreement, then a
government is unlikely to maintain a position on the location of
the boundary that itself stimulates a dispute. This proposition
is, however, difficult to document from public sources.
Authors with knowledge of the factors influencing the U.S.
decision to give full effect to Aves Island in the delimitation
agreement with Venezuela point out that "as a political matter,
there was little to gain and potentially much to lose in asserting
a broader U.S. boundary interest, particularly in light of the
marginal resource interest in the area."37 One is struck by the
comment that "France was so accommodating as to allow Aus-
tralia to use Middleton Reef, a low-tide elevation 125 nautical
miles offshore, as a basepoint" for determining the location of
the equidistant line.38 One of the reasons cited for Norwegian
35. The Iceland-Norway Conciliation Commission recoimnended a joint develop-
ment zone with respect to the continental shelf. It should be noted that the Com-
mission included prominent Icelandic and Norwegian diplomats and made a unani-
mous recommendation as requested. See Iceland-Norway Agreement, supra note 33,
at C9; Evensen, La Ddlimitation du Plateau Continental entre la Norvdge et
lIslande dans le Secteur de Jan Mayen, 27 Ann. Fr. Dr. Int. 711 (1981).
36. Political factors may sometimes influence even technical questions, such as
the issue of which chart to use to depict the agreed boundary. National prestige
may account for the fact that both Italian and Yugoslav charts were used by the
parties, giving rise to differences in numerical identification and location of points.
See Agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia Concerning the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf between the Two Countries, Jan. 8, 1968, Italy-Yugo., Gazz. Uff.,
Supp. to No. 302 of 29 Nov. 1968 (Italy).
37. Feldman & Colson, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States, 75 AM.
J. IN'L L. 729, 747 (1981). One notes that the U.S. did more than just avoid a
fight; it negotiated a treaty giving Venezuela what it wanted, to the chagrin of some
some of Venezuela's other neighbors. Two additional factors are potentially relevant.
First, the U.S. had a general practice of giving full effect to islands in agreements
applying equidistance. Second, Venezuela concluded its agreements with the U.S. and
The Netherlands at the same time.
38. Agreement on Marine Delimitation between the Government of Australia
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acceptance of a full 200-mile zone for Iceland was avoidance of a
fishing dispute over capelin.3" The boundary studies note
Indonesia's generally accommodating attitude toward the loca-
tion of its maritime boundaries with its neighbors.4 It is not
clear whether the fact that most of the joint development zone
falls on the Japanese side of a hypothetical equidistant line with
South Korea is related in some measure to historical problems
in Japanese-Korean relations.
In those situations in which the desire for agreement out-
weighs actual or potential interest in areas that might be dis-
puted, a state is likely to propose a boundary primarily with a
view to facilitating negotiation. The proposal therefore is likely
to be one that the negotiating partner would regard as accept-
able, at least in principle.
In theory, all one need do is split the pie (that is the areas
of overlapping jurisdiction) in half. In practice, geographic char-
acteristics of the respective coasts and their geographic relation-
ship to each other make delimitation a more difficult task even
where states are not focusing on particular resources or areas.
The case of delimitation between relatively small islands
usually presents the most notable exception. There an equidis-
tant line will often halve the pie quite nicely. Thus it is not
surprising that equidistant lines between islands have been used
extensively in deeper parts of the Caribbean Sea and Pacific
Ocean.
A rarer exception arises where relatively regular coasts of
adjacent states face in the same general direction. In that case,
either an equidistant line or a line perpendicular to the general
direction of the coast (in effect an equidistant line modified to
ignore coastal irregularities) will also often halve the pie quite
nicely. Given the great depths off the Pacific coast of South
America, rendering disputes over specific resources in seaward
regions less likely, and the political desire of the states con-
and the Government of the French Republic, Jan. 4, 1982, Austl.-Fr., 1983 Austl.
T.S. No. 2.
39. Iceland-Norway Agreement, supra note 33.
40. See, e.g., the discussion of political strategic, and historical considerations in
the Agreement between Australia and Indonesia Establishing Certain Seabed
Boundaries, May 18, 1971, Austl.-Indon., 974 U.N.T.S. 307 (1975) [hereinafter Aus-
tralia-Indonesia Seabed Agreement].
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cerned to maintain solidarity in support of their new and contro-
versial claims of 200-mile zones, it is not surprising that this
general type of approach was used by Chile, Ecuador and Peru
in the 1952 Santiago Declaration, albeit in the somewhat unusu-
al form of parallels of latitude that are not precisely perpendicu-
lar to the general directions of the coasts at the land frontiers.4
What this indicates is that equidistance or some simple
equivalent is likely to be used where the desire to agree on both
sides is stronger than the interest in maximizing claims, where
specific resources or areas are not a major issue, and where the
coastal characteristics are such that the resultant division of
overlapping claims seems fair. In other situations, it cannot be
asserted either that the use of equidistance necessarily reveals
the existence of a dominant political interest in reaching agree-
ment on the part of one or both parties or that the failure to use
equidistance necessarily represents the absence of a dominant
political interest in reaching agreement on the part of at least
one of the parties. The reason is that in those situations, the
question of fairness is more complex; equidistance may well
represent a victory for one party and a defeat for the other.
D. Legal Factors
Whatever its relative interest in achieving rapid agreement,
a government must take into account the effect of any proposals
it makes on its relations with its neighbors. Powerful states may
be loath to appear like bullies. Strong and weak alike have an
interest in credibility. Unless a state is prepared to expend unre-
lated resources (whether as carrots or sticks) to obtain a favor-
able maritime boundary, its proposal must be grounded in more
than unrestrained self-interest. The search for a platform of
principle will entail, at least in part, a search for a proposal that
has a plausible legal and equitable foundation.
In this context, as in many others, governments can be
expected to consult legal sources that are likely to be regarded
as authoritative or at least persuasive by both parties. Thus, to
some degree, maritime boundary agreements may be analyzed in
41. One is tempted to wonder whether the use of parallels of latitude may
have been related to the fact that the jurisdiction asserted in the declaration extend-
ed "not less than" 200 miles from the coast. See Chile-Peru Agreement, supra note
32; Peru-Ecuador Agreement, supra note 32.
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terms of the chronology of major developments in the law of
maritime delimitation as articulated by multilateral conferences
and international tribunals.
Following the entry into force of the Continental Shelf Con-
vention,42 the United Kingdom and other North Sea states set
about implementing the Convention, including the delimitation
rule in Article 6. A few years later, however, in direct response
to this effort, the International Court of Justice in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases refused to apply Article 6 to a nonparty,
and enunciated a broader set of equitable principles, with sub-
stantial emphasis on the nature of the continental shelf as a
natural prolongation of the land territory of the coastal state.'
The impact of the Court's dictum was unmistakable." The
United States for the first time made clear its view that the
maritime boun dary in the Gulf of Maine should place all of
Georges Bank on the U.S. side. 5 Australia was driven by the
"natural prolongation" language in the opinion to seek, and in
large measure obtain, a continental shelf boundary extending to
the deep trench off the Indonesian coast.46 The summary report
on North Europe notes that the 1969 opinion marks the turning
42. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 24.
43. North Sea Continental Shelf cases, supra note 11.
44. Perhaps its most wide-ranging effect is the new alternative definition of the
continental shelf in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea as the natural pro-
longation of the land territory for a state extending to the outer edge of the conti-
nental margin. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at 10.
45. The position taken by the U.S. in 1970 diplomatic discussions was that "a
boundary in accordance with equitable principles should follow the line of deepest
water through the Northeast Channel, which would bring all of Georges Bank under
U.S. jurisdiction." Feldman & Colson, supra note 37, at 755. For its part, Canada,
which had consistently emphasized equidistance in the Gulf of Maine, later extended
its claim to give reduced effect to Cape Cod and associated islands, relying on the
opinion in the Anglo-French arbitration. It is possible this move was a largely tacti-
cal one related to the forthcoming litigation regarding the Gulf of Maine; it is also
possible this move was not unrelated to the dispute regarding delimitation with
respect to the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon off the Canadian coast.
46. The analysis of the 1972 Australia-Indonesia seabed boundary agreement
points out that not much was known about the resource potential of the seabed
areas in question at the time. See Agreement between Australia and Indonesia Es-
tablishing Certain Seabed Boundaries in the Area of the Timor and Arafura Seas,
Oct. 9, 1972, Austl.-Indon., 974 U.N.T.S. 319 (1957) [hereinafter Australia-Indonesia
Timor and Arafura Seabed Agreement]. The study does not advert to contemporane-
ous rumors that Indonesia reaped certain political benefits in connection with this
agreement.
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point from equidistance to equitable principles in the region. As
tribunals made clear in subsequent opinions, any legal presump-
tion in favor of equidistance, if it ever existed, was gone.
The International Court of Justice subsequently retreated
from natural prolongation in the Tunisia-Libya"7 case and espe-
cially in the Libya-Malta case." The provisional continental
shelf agreement between Australia and Indonesia establishing a
zone of cooperation in the so-called Timor Gap 9 as well as their
provisional fisheries surveillance and enforcement arrange-
ment 0 reveal a substantial retreat from the influence of geo-
morphology in the earlier continental shelf agreement.
The impact of the opinion in the Guinea-Guinea-Bissau
arbitration is not limited to Africa. A specific reaction to that
decision is noted in the study of the Colombia-Honduras delimi-
tation.5
The foregoing are mere illustrations of the fact that while
states are free to ignore their legal rights inter se in reaching
agreement with each other, legal sources may well influence
their claims and expectations, sometimes decisively. 2
47. Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case, supra note 10 .
48. Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1985
I.C.J. Rep. 13 [hereinafter Libya-Malta Continental Shelf Case].
49. Treaty between Australia and Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an
Area between East Timor and Northern Australia, Dec. 11, 1989, Austl.-Indon., 29
I.L.M. 469.
50. Memorandum of Understanding between Indonesia and Australia Concerning
Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Arrangement, Oct. 29, 1981, Austl.-Indon.
(unpublished).
51. See Maritime Delimitation Treaty, Aug. 2, 1986, Colom.-Hond., (Rep. 2-4),
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 502.
52. One might compare the comments of knowledgeable American and British
foreign ministry lawyers in this regard. The former state that U.S. maritime bound-
ary treaties "are not agreements of maximum advantage for either side. Nor are
they driven by particular theories of international law. They are negotiated agree-
ments based on mutual interest and applying methodologies suitable to expressing
that interest in the particular circumstance" See Feldman & Colson, supra note 37,
at 742. The latter (Anderson) states that the Irish-United Kingdom agreement "has
been cited as a model for reaching pragmatic solutions to previously intractable
boundary disputes. Geographical and legal factors played an important part in a
successful effort to reach an equitable solution, acceptable to the respective govern-
ments and legislatures." Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between the Two Countries, Nov. 7, 1988, Ir.-U.K, U.KT.S. No. 20 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Ireland-United Kingdom Agreement].
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E. Effect on Third States
A state faced with the negotiation of several maritime
boundaries will need to consider the effect of its approach to one
boundary on the others. Thus, for example, the United States
has demonstrated a consistent practice of giving full effect to
islands in agreements in which equidistance is used.
At the simplest level - influenced in part by debates of the
issue during the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea -
the text of delimitation agreements may expressly recite the
reliance of the parties on equitable principles" or on equidis-
tance.' Governments may regard such statements as a means
of reinforcing their position of principle with respect to a third
state; they may also be attempting to deal with arguable incon-
sistencies between the result they accepted in the agreement
and the result they propose elsewhere.
In an effort to retain flexibility, some states will wish to
avoid too precise or consistent an articulation of the underlying
rules. Legal and advocacy considerations apart, it is not surpris-
ing that while Canada, in the Gulf of Maine dispute, was adher-
ing fairly closely to an equidistance approach, it articulated the
underlying rules in terms of equitable principles and relevant
circumstances. At the time, other Canadian maritime boundaries
remained to be determined. France and the United States have
taken similar approaches in explaining the various equidistance
boundaries that they negotiated.
53. For example, the Dominican Republic-Venezuela agreement refers to equita-
ble principles, arguably reflecting Venezuela's underlying position in other contexts.
See Treaty on the Delimitation of Marine and Submarine Areas, Mar. 3, 1979, Dom.
Rep.-Venez., G.O., No. 1634, Extraordinario July 28, 1980 (Venez.) [hereinafter Do-
minican Republic-Venezuela Treaty]. The Turkey-U.S.S.R. agreement similarly refers
to equitable principles, presumably reflecting the underlying position of both parties
in other areas, including the Turkish position with respect to Greece in the Aegean.
See Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Black Sea, June
23, 1978, Turk.-U.S.S.R., T.C. Resmi Gazete No. 17226 (1981) (Turkey-U.S.S.R.).
54. For example, the agreement between Greece and Italy refers to the "princi-
ple of the median line" and "mutually approved minor adjustments" thereto. Both
parties may have had other delimitations in mind where they favor equidistance and
full effect for islands. It is interesting that the agreement gives reduced effect to
some islands. See Agreement on the Delimitation of the Zones of the Continental
Shelf Belonging to Each of the Two States, May 24, 1977, Greece-Italy, Limits in
the Seas, No. 96 (1982) [hereinafter Greece-Italy Delimitation Agreement].
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Others may wish to use one or more agreements to influ-
ence an outstanding delimitation either directly or indirectly.
The classic example of this approach is the equidistant line
drawn by Denmark and the Netherlands as part of a more gen-
eral implementation of the equidistance principle in Article 6 of
the Convention on the Continental Shelf in the North Sea that
included, in addition to these two states, Norway and the United
Kingdom. It represented not only an attempt to reinforce the use
of equidistance in the North Sea but, by extending the line to a
point equidistant from their coasts and the German coast, an
effort to apply equidistance directly to their respective bound-
aries with Germany. Similarly, the Denmark-U.K. and Nether-
lands-U.K. equidistant lines in practice met at a tri-junction
point, a result inconsistent (except perhaps in mathematical
theory) with Germany's view that its continental shelf extended
to the middle of the North Sea.
The fact that this effort failed has not necessarily deterred
others. In reaching their continental shelf delimitation agree-
ment with each other, Ireland and the United Kingdom "had
common cause in opposing claims to part of the area by third
States," presumably Denmark and Iceland.55 The equidistant
line between Sicily and Tunisia was drawn as if Malta did not
exist. 6
Agreements delimiting areas claimed by third states are
not, however, common. There is ample evidence of restraint.
Numerous bilaterally drawn boundaries are terminated short of
the tri-junction point with a third state even in the absence of
any known dispute.57
In both the TunisialLibya8 and Libya /Malta 5 cases, the
Court took care to protect the interests of a concerned third
state that, in each case, was unsuccessful in its efforts to inter-
55. Ireland-United Kingdom Agreement, supra note 52, at 20.
56. Agreement of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Two Coun-
tries, Aug. 20, 1971, Italy-Tunis, Limits in the Seas, No. 89 (1980). The boundary
terminates in the southeast at a point roughly equidistant between Malta and the
Italian island of Lampedusa; the latter was accorded only a thirteen-mile zone as
against Tunisia.
57. An example is the Greece-Italy boundary, which stops short of the tri-junc-
tion points with Albania in the north and Libya in the south. Greece-Italy Delimita-
tion Agreement, supra note 54.
58. Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case, supra note 10.
59. Libya-Malta Continental Shelf Case, supra note 48.
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vene. In the first case, the Court did not specify the northeast
terminus of the final segment of the boundary running in the
direction of Malta. In the second case, the Court did not specify
a boundary between the parties in areas claimed by Italy.
Efforts at indirectly influencing the boundaries with third
states nevertheless persist:
* the boundary studies suggest that Venezuela embarked on a
strategy of entering into delimitation agreements giving
Ayes Island full, or substantial effect in hopes of influencing
other governments to do the same, choosing to conclude the
initial agreements with The Netherlands and the United
States simultaneously,"0 and with France two years lat-
er;
61
* Colombia appears to have attempted to structure its delimi-
tation agreements with Costa Rica,62 Honduras63 and Pan-
ama' to be consistent with its position with regard to the
use of the 82 degrees W meridian under a 1930 exchange of
notes in connection with its dispute with Nicaragua;
* Denmark and Sweden apparently felt that agreeing to give
full effect to Bornholm in their agreement with each other
would strengthen the Danish position vis-&-vis the GDR and
Poland and the Swedish position in support of full effect for
Gotland vis-a-vis Poland and the U.S.S.R.; 5
60. Delimitation Treaty between Netherlands and Venezuela, Dec. 15, 1978,
Neth.-Venez., Tractenblad van Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Jaargang 1978, No.
61.
61. Delimitation Treaty between Venezuela and France, July 17, 1980, Fr.-
Venez., G.O., No. 3026, Jan. 28, 1983 (Venez.).
62. Treaty on the Delimitation of Marine and submarine Areas and Maritime
Cooperation, Mar. 17, 1977, Colom.-Costa Rica, Limits in the Seas, No. 79 (1978).
63. Maritime Delimitation Treaty, Aug. 2, 1986, Colom.-Hond., U.N., Oficina de
Ocednicos y del Derecho del Mar. Boletin No. 10, (Nov. 1987).
64. Treaty on the Delimitation of Marine and Submarine Areas, Nov. 20, 1976,
Colom.-Pan., Limits in the Seas, No. 79 (1978). Colombia's recognition of Panama's
historic claim to the Gulf of Panama was apparently phrased not only to protect its
nonrecognition of Venezuela's claim in the Gulf of Venezuela but, according to the
boundary study, to advance Colombia's position that Venezuela's claim must be rec-
ognized by Colombia in order to influence the delimitation.
65. Eric Franckx, Baltic Sea Maritime Boundaries, in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
BOUNDARIES 345, supra note 20. See also Agreement between Denmark and Sweden
on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf and Fishing Zones, Nov. 9, 1984, Den-
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in advance of reaching agreement on a precise boundary,
Brazil and Uruguay issued a joint declaration supporting
the use of equidistance. This may have been intended to
counter an Argentine desire to duplicate the practice on the
west coast of South America and use a parallel of latitude in
its delimitation with Uruguay."6
The tribunal in the Guinea-Guinea-Bissau arbitration 7
devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of cut-off or
enclavement, which occurs when a state's boundaries with
neighboring (usually adjacent) states join at a point off its coast.
This problem can be avoided if the boundaries on either side are
coordinated so as to avoid a cut-off effect. The difficulty is that
only the boundary between the parties to the arbitration is at
issue. By emphasizing the need to avoid enclavement, determin-
ing the broad general direction of the coast with reference to the
coasts of the immediate neighbors of both parties, and establish-
ing the longest seaward segment of the boundary as a perpendic-
ular to that general direction, the tribunal in effect was taking
an approach of broader utility in West Africa, and appears to
have been aware of this.
F. Sovereignty Disputes
In principle, all areas of land, including small islands and
rocks above water at high tide, are entitled to some maritime
jurisdiction." If strict equidistance is the method of delimita-
tion, they will have the same effect as promontories on much
larger islands or longer continental coasts. Accordingly, the
mark-Sweden, Sveriges bverenskommelser med fr5mmande makter 1985:54 (Sweden).
Neither party was completely successful.
66. Agreement Relating to the Maritime Delimitation between Brazil and Uru-
guay, July 21, 1972, Braz.-Uru., 1120 U.N.T.S. 133. Given the generally northeast-
ward direction of the coast, the use of a parallel of latitude by Argentina and Uru-
guay would either have disadvantaged Brazil were such a parallel to be used be-
tween Brazil and Uruguay, or would have resulted in a substantial enclavement of
the Uruguayan zone between the parallel to the south and an equidistant line with
Brazil to the north.
67. Guinea-Guinea-Bissau Award, supra note 33.
68. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, art. 21. That
article specifies by way of exception "rocks which cannot sustain human habitation
or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf."
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existence of sovereignty dispute over insular or other coastal
territory in an area requiring delimitation is likely to affect the
delimitation agreement including, in many cases, the boundary
itself.
If only one party to the negotiations is affected, the other
may be reluctant to get involved. For example, the boundary
drawn by Australia and France is terminated to the east at a
point that avoids involving Australia in the territorial dispute
between France and Vanuatu over certain islands controlled by
France and also claimed by Vanuatu." The same problem has
apparently delayed Fiji's ratification of its delimitation agree-
ment with France.70 The terminus of the Atlantic maritime
boundary between Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela was
shifted slightly to the north of a hypothetical tri-junction point
with Guyana in order to avoid involving Trinidad and Tobago in
any dispute between Guyana and Venezuela.7'
If the sovereignty dispute is between the two states estab-
lishing the maritime boundary, they may use the same tech-
nique employed in the Australia-France agreement, namely
terminating the boundary at a point where they agree that the
disputed territory would not influence the location of the bound-
ary. For example, this approach has been used with respect to
disputed islands by Japan and South Korea72 as well as France
and Mauritius.73 It was also used by Canada and the United
States in the Gulf of Maine, where the landward terminus of the
boundary the Chamber was asked to draw was located at sea in
a manner designed to avoid the issue of sovereignty over
Machias Seal Island and North Rock." Italy and Yugoslavia's
69. Agreement on Marine Delimitation, Jan. 4, 1982, Austl.-Fr., 1983 Austl.
T.S. No. 2.
70. Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of an Economic Zone, Jan. 19, 1983,
Fr.-Fiji,(Rep. 5-6), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 20,
at 995.
71. Treaty on the Delimitation of Marine and Submarine Areas, Apr. 18, 1990,
Trin. & Tobago-Venez., G.O., No. 34745, July 23, 1991 (Venez.).
72. Agreement Concerning the Establishment of Boundary in the Northern Part
of the Continental Shelf, Jan. 30, 1974, Japan-S. Korea, Limits in the Seas, No. 75
(1979).
73. Agreement on the Delimitation of the French and Mauritian Economic
Zones, Apr. 2, 1980, Fr.-Mauritius, Limits in the Seas, No. 75 (1979).
74. Treaty to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement on the Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Mar. 29, 1979, Can.-U.S., 23 I.L.M.
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maritime boundary originally stopped short of the Gulf of
Trieste because the land border in the Trieste region was not
settled.75 It appears that the extensive delimitations agreed by
the Irish Republic and the United Kingdom do not include de-
limitations measured from Northern Ireland.76
Another approach is to resolve the sovereignty dispute and
the maritime boundary simultaneously. Perhaps the best known
examples are the treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia settling
both their land and territorial sea boundary in the Trieste re-
gion" and the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Maritime De-
limitation between Argentina and Chile following the Beagle
Channel arbitration, Argentina's rejection of the award, and
mediation by the Vatican.78 There are others.79 In some cases,
the maritime boundary is expressly identified as the line divid-
ing sovereignty over islands as well;"0 there may even be spe-
1197. It might also be noted that Art. 298(1)(a)(i) of the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, supra note 2, permits a party to exclude from arbitration, adjudica-
tion or conciliation a maritime boundary dispute "that necessarily involves the con-
current consideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights
over continental or insular land territory." Id.
75. Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the Two
Countries, Jan. 8, 1968, Italy-Yugo., 7 I.L.M. 547.
76. Ireland-United Kingdom Agreement, supra note 52.
77. Treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia, Nov. 10, 1975, Italy-Yugo., Gazz. Uff.,
Supp. to No. 77 of Mar. 21, 1977 (Italy) (hereinafter Italy-Yugoslavia Treaty].
78. Argentina-Chile Agreement, supra note 31, at 11.
79. The following are some examples. Because of its desire not to inhibit
friendly relations, the United States abandoned its insular sovereignty clams in its
delimitation agreements with the Cook Islands and with New Zealand with respect
to Tokelau. See Treaty on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between the
United States of America and the Cook Islands, June 11, 1980, Cook Islands-U.S.,
T.I.A.S. No. 10774; Treaty on the Maritime Boundary between Tokelau and the
United States of America, Dec. 2, 1980, N.Z.-U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 10775. New Zealand
acknowledged that Swains Island is part of American Samoa. Bahrain and Saudi
Arabia simultaneously divided disputed islands. See Agreement Concerning Delimita-
tion of the Continental Shelf, Feb. 22, 1958, Bahr.-Saudi Arabia, 409 (U.N. Legis-
lative Series), U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER. B/16 (1974). The 1973 agreement between
Australia and Indonesia settling the land boundary between Indonesia and Papua
New Guinea (which Australia then represented) also settled a landward gap in the
maritime boundary. Australia-Indonesia Certain Boundaries Agreements, supra note
19. North Korea and the U.S.S.R. simultaneously settled their boundary in the
Tumnen River and their territorial sea boundary. Soviet-Korea National Border Agree-
ment, supra note 20. Interestingly, Abu Dhabi and Dubai simultaneously moved
their land frontier and their previously agreed maritime boundary ten kilometers to
the west. Offshore Boundary Agreement between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, Feb. 18,
1968, Abu Dhabi-Dubai, I Can. Annex 151 (1983) [hereinafter Abu Dhabi-Dubai Off-
shore Boundary Agreement].
80. The following are some examples: The division of sovereignty over islands
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cific reference to islands that may emerge in the future.81 In
some cases, the islands with respect to which sovereignty is
resolved are given reduced effect in the maritime delimitation.
2
III. STRATEGIC FACTORS
A. Introduction
While it is reasonably clear that at least some maritime
boundaries were influenced by security interests, those interests
are almost never adverted to in the text of the agreement and
only rarely, and then often obliquely, in related commentary of
governments. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that
defense ministries are often consulted as governments develop
their maritime boundary positions." At times those ministries
are represented on negotiating delegations. It seems reasonable
to conclude that, whatever the apparent factors influencing its
location, the acceptability of the boundary may well be reviewed
from a security perspective.
between Australia and Papua New Guinea under article 2 of the agreement is in
part based on the seabed delimitation line. See Australia-Indonesia Certain
Boundaries Agreements, supra note 19. The same approach was used by Abu Dhabi
and Qatar. See Agreement on Settlement of Maritime Boundary Lines, Mar. 20,
1969, Qatar-U.A.E., 403 (U.N. Legislative Series) U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/16
(1974).
81. See Agreement on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the
Adaman Sea, Dec. 23, 1986, Burma-India, art. 5, 27 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter Burma-
India Agreement].
82. Burma abandoned its claim to Narcondam Island and India did not insist
on the maximum possible claims from either Narcondam Island or Barren Island.
See Agreement on the Boundary in Historic Waters between India and Sri-Lanka,
June 26-28, 1974, India-Sri Lanka, 13 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter India-Sri-Lanka
Agreement]. In the agreement regarding Palk Strait and Bay, the island is not
counted at all in the delimitation, and there is provision for access to the island for
fishermen and pilgrims. The Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement limits the effect of the
islands to twelve miles. See Agreement Concerning the Delimitation of the Boundary
Line Separating Submarine Areas, Oct. 24, 1968, Iran-Saudi Arabia, 696 U.N.T.S.
189. It is not clear what influence a 1927 Icelandic letter reserving rights to the re-
sources of Jan Mayen, prior to the formal Norwegian claim to Jan Mayen in 1929,
had on the agreement to accord Iceland a full 200-mile exclusive economic zone in
areas where the distance between the coasts is less than 400 miles, or on the Con-
ciliation Commission's decision to establish a substantial joint management area with
respect to seabed resources, mostly on the Jan Mayen side of that 200-mile line.
Iceland-Norway Agreement, supra note 33.
83. In some cases, the navy is the primary internal source of charts, technical
data, or maritime expertise.
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A number of economic and other factors dealt with in other
chapters of this study may engage the perceived security inter-
ests of a particular state. In a narrow sense, the term "security"
might refer to the right to conduct and, conversely, the right to
restrict military activities at sea, principally by warships, coast
guard vessels, and state aircraft. Yet even in that narrow sense,
it is difficult to distinguish commercial navigation interests from
security interests. Moreover, governments have asserted that
the movement of international trade, and access to and control
over mineral and hydrocarbon resources of the seabed, engage
not only their economic but their security interests.84 In the
broadest sense, a state's efforts to accumulate friends and con-
trol the emergence or leverage of adversaries are fundamentally
tied to its security.
B. Types of Security Concerns
Two different aspects of security are potentially affected by
maritime delimitation. One is the desire of a state to exclude or
control activities of foreign states off its coast that it perceives to
be prejudicial to its security.85 The other is the desire of a state
to be able to ensure that its own or foreign activities that are
important to its security may be conducted without foreign in-
terference, including protection of its access to the open sea and
communications by sea and air with foreign states.
Under the regimes set forth in the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, 6 these interests are unquestionably
affected in waters subject to the sovereignty of the coastal state,
namely internal waters, archipelagic waters, and the territorial
sea. That sovereignty is qualified by the right of innocent pas-
sage, which is subject to certain coastal state regulatory powers
as well as the power to take measures to prevent passage that is
not innocent and the power to suspend innocent passage outside
straits. That sovereignty is also qualified by the right of ships
84. Soviet experts have spoken of environmental security, using the same Rus-
sian word that is used in "Security Council" and "Committee on State Security"
(KGB). The cognates for "security" in many Romance languages may share the argu-
ably broader meaning of "safety."
85. The political reality of this perception of security is to be distinguished
from its substantive merits. Some might argue that, in certain situations, demagogy,
paranoia, or xenophobia are better explanations for the perception.
86. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2.
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and aircraft to transit passage of straits and archipelagic sea
lanes passage.
As the tribunal in the Guinea-Guinea-Bissau arbitration
observed, 7 the continental shelf and the exclusive economic
zone are not zones of sovereignty, but rather areas in which the
coastal state exercises more limited sovereign rights and juris-
diction for specific purposes. These are identified in detail in the
United Nations Convention. In particular, freedom of navigation
and overflight are expressly protected in the provisions dealing
with the exclusive economic zone as well as the continental
shelf. There are nevertheless aspects of these regimes that
states may perceive as affecting their security interests:
* The United Nations Convention provides that artificial in-
stallations used for resource or other economic purposes are
subject to coastal state control in the exclusive economic
zone and on the continental shelf. The same is true of scien-
tific installations as well as any other installations that may
interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal
state."
* The coastal state largely has a free hand in determining
where it will permit installations (and the safety zones
around them) to be placed in its exclusive economic zone
and on its continental shelf, subject to a somewhat narrowly
phrased duty to avoid recognized sea lanes essential to in-
ternational navigation, 9 supplemented in the U.N. Con-
vention, by a general duty to avoid interference with naviga-
tion."0 A neighboring state could be concerned about its
87. Guinea-Guinea-Bissau Award, supra note 33, at 124.
88. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, arts. 60, 80, 81.
89. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, art. 60, $ 7, repeat-
ing art. 5, T 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 24.
90. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, arts. 56(3), 58, 78(2),
87. While Article 87 of the U.N. Convention includes among the express freedoms of
the high seas the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, this freedom is
.subject to Part VI" dealing with the continental shelf. Pursuant to Part VI, Article
79, the coastal state duty not to impede the laying or maintenance of cables and
pipelines is subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of
the continental shelf, the exploration of its natural resources and the prevention,
reduction, and control of pollution from pipelines. Moreover, the delineation of the
course for the laying of pipelines on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of
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access routes.
The U.N. Convention accords the coastal state enforcement
rights over foreign ships in its exclusive economic zone with
respect to pollution in contravention of international stan-
dards or internationally approved coastal state standards
(and, in limited circumstances such as dumping or ice-cov-
ered areas, unilateral coastal state standards). The complex
and carefully balanced provisions of the Convention on this
matter are sometimes omitted from national laws on the
exclusive economic zone that nevertheless contain a general-
ized assertion of jurisdiction with respect to control of pollu-
tion.
The trend in the twentieth century has been one of expand-
ing coastal state jurisdiction in both a geographic and a
functional sense. This trend may continue, either in terms
of a gradual coastal shift in the balance between coastal and
other interests in the exclusive economic zone or in some
other way. Governments concerned with protecting their
access to the sea may consider it prudent to deal with that
contingency. In this connection it remains unclear whether
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea will
eventually receive widespread adherence and, in any event,
precisely how it will be interpreted and exactly how much of
a restraining influence it will be.
C. Exclusionary Interest
There is very little evidence of boundaries being drawn to
reflect a security interest of the coastal state in excluding or
controlling foreign activities off its coast." That security inter-
the coastal state.
91. It is said that strategic considerations influenced the strong position taken
by Sweden in favor of full effect for Gotland in its negotiations with the U.S.S.R.
Sweden eventually settled for seventy-five percent effect. Agreement on the Delimi-
tation of the Continental Shelf and of the Swedish Fishing Zone and the Soviet
Economic Zone in the Baltic Sea, Apr. 18, 1988, Swed.-U.S.S.R., 27 I.L.M. 295. It is
possible that traditional Soviet sensitivity concerning the security of the Arctic coast,
at times associated with the so-called sector principle, was a factor that encouraged
the Soviet Union to regard the line set forth in the 1867 U.S.-Russia Convention
ceding Alaska as the maritime boundary; north of the Bering Strait, the line follows
a meridian of longitude due north into the Arctic Ocean. See Maritime Boundary
Agreement, June 15, 1990, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 I.L.M. 941 (1990) [hereinafter U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Boundary Agreement].
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est is sometimes perceived in terms of proximity to the coast.92
An equidistant line, usually regarded as based exclusively on
geographic factors, or some other line reasonably far from the
coast might accordingly commend itself to some parties as an
appropriate accommodation of their respective coastal security
interests. Since the security factor is masked, it is difficult to tell
whether it actually influenced the behavior of governments.
In the Libya-Malta case, the Court noted that the delimita-
tion resulting from its judgement is "not so near to the coasts of
either Party as to make questions of security a particular consid-
eration in the present case."93 The tribunal in the Guinea-Guin-
ea-Bissau arbitration made a similar point, noting that security
implications are avoided under its proposed solution by the fact
that each state controls the maritime territories opposite its
coasts and in their vicinity.94 It may well be that governments,
like these two tribunals, are more likely to test particular pro-
posed results against this security concern than to shape a pro-
posal specifically in response to this concern.
It is also sometimes difficult to tell whether a boundary
drawn to maximize access to and from a naval base, for exam-
ple, is not - at least in the territorial sea - also designed to
maximize that state's control over foreign activities near the
base. It is reported that Soviet strategic interests with respect to
the main Pacific fleet naval base at Vladivostok produced a
territorial sea boundary more favorable to the U.S.S.R. than a
hypothetical equidistant line.95 There can be no doubt that ac-
cess to and from the base was a primary strategic concern. It is
92. Malta associated security interests with proximity to the coast in its ar-
guments before the International Court of Justice regarding the delimitation of its
continental shelf with Libya. See Libya-Malta Continental Shelf Case, supra note 48.
Guinea-Bissau did much the same in its arbitration with Guinea-Guinea-Bissau Arbi-
tration, supra note 33. The Truman Proclamation on the Continental shelf, supra
note 6, might suggest an analogous view of security (however unlikely the prove-
nance of that limited vision from the world's dominant maritime power might appear
to some observers). The preamble includes, as the final item in the list of justifica-
tions for the assertion of jurisdiction over the resources of the continental shelf, the
statement, "since self-protection compels the coastal nation to keep close watch over
activities off its shores which are of the nature necessary for utilization of these
resources." Id.
93. Libya-Malta Continental Shelf Case, supra note 48, % 51.
94. See Guinea-Guinea-Bissau Award, supra note 33, at 251.
95. Soviet-Korea National Border Agreement, supra note 20.
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not clear that this was the only strategic concern.
D. Access to and from the Open Sea
There is ample evidence that concerns about access to and
from the sea have influenced maritime boundaries either direct-
ly by altering or confirming their location or indirectly by
prompting simultaneous agreement on substantive provisions
protecting navigation rights. The summary report with respect
to the Baltic Sea notes that only navigation interests were
strong enough to prevail over the general use of equidistance in
that region.
It is often difficult to tell whether a state's preoccupation
with navigation derives primarily from economic or security
concerns. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that secu-
rity concerns regarding access relate not only to the naval and
air forces of the particular coastal state, but to access for the
forces of friendly states and, beyond that, to the protection of
trading and communications routes fundamental to the economy
of the state.
One would expect most explicit concerns with naval access
to be manifested by major naval powers. It is nevertheless inter-
esting that Soviet boundaries figure prominently in the referenc-
es in the boundary studies to maritime boundaries configured in
response to concerns about naval access. 6 This may reflect the
circumstances of Soviet geography, the historic Russian and
96. See Id.; see also Agreement Concerning the Sea Frontier in the
Varangeriord of 15 February 1957 and Protocol of 29 November 1957, Feb. 15,
1957; Nov. 29, 1957, Nor.-U.SS.R., Limits in the Seas, No. 17 (1970) in the "stra-
tegically and politically sensitive" area of the Varangerijord, where the "boundary
runs, broadly speaking, across the broad mouth of the Gulf leaving plenty of water
on either side for access from the fjord to the Barents Sea"; see also Agreement
Concerning the Boundaries of Sea Areas and of the Continental Shelf in the Gulf of
Finland, May 25, 1966, Fin.-U.S.S.R., 566 U.N.T.S. 37, where the territorial sea
boundary in the Gulf of Finland established by the 1940 and 1947 peace treaties
between the parties was heavily influenced by Soviet security concerns, and where
Gogland (Suursaari) Island was given only limited effect to safeguard free navigation
north of it. The elaborate provisions in the Turkey-Soviet Union territorial sea agree-
ment for range markers and for situations where the markers are seen as overlap-
ping (possibly causing a vessel to cross the line inadvertently) presumably reflect an
underlying concern about protecting navigation in an area of zealous coastal security
enforcement. See Protocol Concerning the Territorial Sea Boundary Between the Two
States in the Black Sea, Apr. 17, 1973, Turk.-U.S.S.R., Limits in the Seas, No. 59
[hereinafter Turkey-U.S.S.R. Protocol].
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Soviet preoccupation with access to the sea, greater emphasis on
security concerns in Soviet policy-making, or a tendency by out-
side observers to emphasize security factors in their analyses of
Soviet motives.
The Soviet Union is not, however, alone. While it is common
in connection with base rights agreements to provide for rights
of access through the waters and air space of the host state, the
Cyprus-United Kingdom agreement went further. It established
lines extending seaward from the U.K. bases between which Cy-
prus may not claim territorial waters. 7 The United States' de-
sire to protect transit routes to and from San Diego, where it
has a major naval base, is cited as a factor supporting the deci-
sion to give full effect to islands in a delimitation based on equi-
distance." France made strategic arguments, particularly re-
garding access to the port of Cherbourg, in the Anglo-French
arbitration. In effect, the tribunal gave priority to French inter-
ests in navigation and security between the eastern and western
parts of the English Channel.9
States may desire to ensure that specific navigation routes
are within their own waters, or at least outside the waters of the
neighboring state. The Soviet, U.K, U.S., and French examples
already cited are generally of this type. There are, however,
others.
The practice of dividing the deep channel continues to be
used close to shore. This may be done when the channel extends
seaward from a land boundary in a river: the inner part of the
line used in the Guinea-Guinea-Bissau arbitration follows an
97. Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Annex A.,
Aug. 16, 1960, Cyprus-U.K., 382 U.N.T.S. 10 [hereinafter Cyprus Treaty].
98. Exchange of Notes Effecting Agreement on the Provisional Maritime Bound-
ary, Nov. 24, 1976, Mex.-U.S., T.I.A-S. 8805 [hereinafter Mexico-United States Ex-
change of Notes]; Treaty about Maritime Boundaries, May 4, 1978, Mex.-U.S., 17
I.L.M. 1073.
99. Agreement on the Shelf Boundary in the Eastern Channel and Southern
North Sea, June 24, 1982, Fr.-U.I., U.K.T.S. No. 20 [hereinafter United Kingdom-
France Shelf Boundary Agreement]. While navigation factors apparently did not
affect the negotiated boundary as such, in general the east-west lane of the traffic
separation scheme is on the U.K. side while the west-east lane is on the French
side. Agreements between France and United Kingdom Relating to the Delimitation
of the Continental Shelf in the English Channel, July 10, 1975, U.KT.S. No. 20
(1983).
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"historic" boundary using the thalweg."' It may also be done
when the channel lies between the opposite coasts of the parties:
the Indonesia-Singapore boundary generally follows the deep
draught tanker route, even extending within the Indonesian
archipelagic baselines at one point.' °' In other cases, the chan-
nel may be of principal concern to one state. The boundary be-
tween the Federal Republic of Germany and the former German
Democratic Republic in Lubeck Bay located the entire shipping
route to the FRG ports on the FRG side." 2
On occasion, a state may limit its objectives to ensuring that
a navigation route or other areas, although not within its own
waters, are outside the waters, or at least the territorial sea, of
the neighboring state.0" The Argentina-Chile treaty limits the
territorial sea, as between the parties, to three miles in some
areas. 10 The Australia-Papua New Guinea treaty limits the
territorial sea of certain islands to three miles, and in other
respects limits the territorial seas and archipelagic waters of the
parties.' The agreement between Poland and the former Ger-
man Democratic Republic is specifically designed to protect the
northern access route to Polish ports, in part by limiting the
territorial sea and other jurisdiction of the GDR."0'
Two interesting agreements specifically limit certain types
of coastal state jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone and
on the continental shelf. The Netherlands-Venezuela agreement
places limits on the exercise of jurisdiction to prevent pollution
from ships and requires mutual agreement for emplacing struc-
100. Guinea-Guinea-Bissau Award, supra note 33, 9 45, 111.
101. Indonesia-Singapore Sea Boundary Agreement, supra note 21.
102. F.R.G.-G.D.R. Protocol Note, supra note 16. The boundary study notes that
the FRG may also have considered its submarine testing areas near Nuestadt in
connection with this boundary.
103. The Cyprus-U.K Agreement discussed above is an example. See Cyprus
Treaty, supra note 97.
104. Argentina-Chile Agreement, supra note 31, at 11.
105. See Australia-Papua New Guinea Treaty, supra note 4.
106. Treaty between German Democratic Republic and Poland Concerning the
Delimitation of the Sea Areas in the Oder Bight, May 22, 1989, G,D.R.-Pol., GBl. II,
No. 9, 28 July 1989, at 150-151 (G.D.R.) (discarding Treaty between the German
Democratic Republic and Poland Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf in the Baltic Sea, Oct 29, 1968, G.D.R.-Poland, 768 U.N.T.S. 260 (1971). In the
interim, a dispute over navigation erupted between the parties that was extensively
debated in the polish parliament. See Treaty between Germany and Poland Concern-
ing the Confirmation of the Frontier Existing between Them, Nov. 14, 1990, F.R.G.-
Pol., reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 2023.
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tures that may obstruct recognized sea lanes."'o The Australia-
Papua New Guinea agreement defines an area within the cen-
tral Torres Strait, where the fisheries and seabed delimitation
lines diverge, in which the exercise of "residual jurisdiction"
requires the concurrence of the other party. "Residual jurisdic-
tion" is defined as jurisdiction other than seabed and fisheries
jurisdiction as well as seabed and fisheries jurisdiction not di-
rectly related to the exploration or exploitation of resources.o'
A number of agreements are structured so that each party's
vessels can travel to and from its ports on its own side of the
boundary. In many situations this objective can be achieved by
any of several plausible maritime boundaries, and thus may not
be evident in the specific location or discussion of the boundary.
With respect to the France-Italy delimitation in the Straits
of Bonifacio, it is suggested that the "desire of both parties to
reach a delimitation which would permit passage through the
Mouths without entering the territorial sea of the other party
might have influenced the negotiations."' A similar consider-
ation is said to have influenced the Italy-Yugoslavia territorial
sea boundary in the Gulf of Trieste; in this connection, the Ital-
ian Foreign Minister referred to the navigation of large tonnage
ships without the necessity of passing through Yugoslav
waters.110 Navigation interests prevailed over effect for the is-
land of Ven in the 1932 territorial sea delimitation in the Sound
between Denmark and Sweden.'
107. Delimitation Treaty between the Netherlands and Venezuela, Mar. 31, 1978,
Neth.-Venez., 1978 Tractenblad va het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden No. 61 (Neth.)
[hereinafter Netherlands-Venezuela Agreement].
108. Australia-Papua New Guinea Treaty, supra note 4.
109. Convention between Italy and France Relating to the Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundaries in the Area of the Mouths of Bonifacio, Nov. 28, 1086, Fr.-
Italy, Gazz. Uff., Suppl. to No. 48 of 27 Feb. 1989 (Italy) [hereinafter Italy-France
Convention].
110. Italy-Yugoslavia Treaty, supra note 77.
111. Agreement between Denmark and Sweden on the Delimitation of the Conti-
nental Shelf and Fishing Zones, Nov. 9, 1984, Den.-Swed., Sveriges
overenskommelser med frammande makter 1985:54 (Swed.).
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E. Enclavement
A particular problem is posed by the so-called cut-off or
enclavement effect that can arise when the maritime boundaries
between a state and its neighbors meet at a point off its coast.
In the case of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, some cut-off
effects are unavoidable. Despite this fact, extension of a state's
jurisdiction so as to avoid enclavement by its boundaries with
some states (e.g., adjacent states) can minimize the number of
states whose zones stand between the "enclaved" state and the
open sea. Thus, for example, as a result of the agreements im-
plementing the decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf
cases, the German continental shelf connects directly with the
British for a small distance."'
The concern about enclavement may engage both types of
perceived security interests. States prefer not to be surrounded
by their neighbors. In some measure this concern may be politi-
cal and psychological. States have articulated security concerns
about their capacity to conduct and control activities off their
coast. More concretely, states may be concerned about access
between their territory and the open sea.
In three cases, the maritime zones of small states with the
same coastal neighbor on either side were protected from
enclavement by the use of parallel lines defining the small
state's zones."' With respect to The Gambia, parallels of lati-
tude were extended out into the open Atlantic.1 Monaco re-
ceived a corridor up to the outer limit of the territorial sea, as
well as a corridor beyond extending up to an equidistant line
with the opposite coast on the island of Corsica. " The bound-
ary lines between Dominica, on the one hand, and Martinique
and Guadaloupe on the other, were extended in quasi-parallel
fashion up to 200 miles on the Atlantic side." 6
112. Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United King-
dom Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under the North Sea be-
tween the Two Countries, Nov. 25, 1971, F.R.G.-U.K, 880 U.N.T.S. 185. See U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
113. The land territory of the state concerned is itself surrounded by the other
state in the first two cases.
114. Gambia-Senegal Agreement, supra note 33.
115. Monaco-France Delimitation Agreement, supra note 33. As Corsica is part of
France, some "enclavement" by French zones was ultimately unavoidable.
116. Agreement on Maritime Delimitation between Dominica and France, Sept. 7,
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Where a state's boundaries with more than one state pose
the risk of enclavement, one cannot be certain the risk has been
avoided absent agreement on maritime boundaries with all of
the neighboring states concerned. Boundaries between only two
states nevertheless can be drawn so as to minimize the risk of
enclavement when future boundaries are completed, thereby
attempting as far as possible to assure each state access to the
open ocean through its own zones and to avoid the presence of a
foreign zone opposite a state's coast. This is precisely what the
arbitral tribunal did in the Guinea-Guinea-Bissau arbitra-
tion."7 Parallels of latitude were apparently used for this pur-
pose in the seaward segments of the Kenya-Tanzania"' and
Mozambique-Tanzania"' delimitations.1 "
F. Specific Clauses Protecting Navigation
Delimitation agreements sometimes contain specific clauses
protecting navigation interests. A number of these arise in a
context where the clause appears to be related to the navigation
implications of the particular maritime boundary. Others seem
to reflect a more general concern about navigation that is not
necessarily associated with any particular boundary location or
configuration. It is not always easy to tell the difference.
The Argentina-Chile treaty makes elaborate provision for
1987, Dominica-Fr., Rev. Gbn. D.I. Pub. 486-90 (1989).
117. Guinea-Guinea-Bissau Award, supra note 33.
118. Agreement between Kenya and Tanzania on Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between the Two States, July 9, 1976, Kenya-Tanz., (U.N. Legislative Se-
ries) U.N. Doc. STJLEG/SER.B/19 (1980).
119. Agreement between Tanzania and Mozambique, Dec. 28, 1988, Tanz.-
Mozam. (Rep. 4-7), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note
20, at 893.
120. The 1969 Brazil-Uruguay joint declaration supporting equidistance may have
been prompted by a desire to demonstrate to Argentina that the use of a parallel of
latitude between Uruguay and Argentina would have an enclavement effect when
coupled with a Brazil-Uruguay equidistant line, that the acceptability of a parallel of
latitude method to Uruguay was therefore (apart from other objections) rationally
dependent upon its acceptability to Brazil, and that Brazilian agreement was not
likely. See Agreement between Brazil and Uruguay Relating to the Maritime Delimi-
tation between the Two Countries, July 21, 1972, Braz.-Uru., 1120 U.N.T.S. 133
(1978). Although Argentina was not threatened with enclavement as such, the Argen-
tina-Chile treaty reflects Argentine concerns about any cut-off of its extension into
the Atlantic Ocean, and offers some support for the so-called bi-oceanic principle
defended by Argentina. See Argentina-Chile Agreement, supra note 31.
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the protection of navigation, including a reaffirmation of freedom
of navigation in and in the approaches to the Strait of Magel-
lan."' The Australia-Papua New Guinea treaty contains exten-
sive provisions designed to protect navigation and overflight in
the Torres Strait area.2 2 In the Maroua Declaration extending
the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, the "two
Heads of State further reaffirmed their commitment to freedom
and security of navigation in the Calabar/Cross River channel of
ships of the two countries as defined by International Treaties
and Conventions."'23 In these cases, there appears to be a fair-
ly close substantive link between these provisions and the un-
derlying delimitation issues.
There are strong navigation and overflight provisions in the
Netherlands-Venezuela agreement,' and a guarantee of tran-
sit passage between the islands of Trinidad and Tobago in the
Trinidad and Tobago-Venezuela agreement.1" More general
clauses protecting navigation rights can be found in other agree-
ments.'26 These clauses may have facilitated agreement either
by constituting a quid pro quo for a particular boundary or in a
more general sense.
IV. HISTORICAL FACTORS
A. Introduction
Historical factors are perhaps easier to isolate than political
factors. Yet in the context of maritime boundaries, there is a
great deal of overlap with other factors. Historic fishing may be
121. Argentina-Chile Agreement, supra note 31.
122. Australia-Papua New Guinea Treaty, supra note 4.
123. Agreement between Cameroon and Nigeria, June 1, 1975, Cameroon-Nig.,
Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-84) 97 (1987).
124. Netherlands-Venezuela Agreement, supra note 107.
125. Treaty between Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela on the Delimitation of
Marine and Submarine Areas, April 18, 1990, Trin. & Tobago-Venez., G.O., No.
34745, June 28, 1991 (Venez.).
126. See, e.g., Agreement between Argentina and Uruguay Relating to the Delim-
itation of the River Plate and the Maritime Boundary between the Two Countries,
Nov. 19, 1973, Arg.-Uru., U.N.T.S., No. 21424; Panama-Colombia Treaty, supra note
20; Dominican Republic-Venezuela Treaty, supra note 53, at 1634 (preambular ref-
erence to Venezuelan navigation interests); India-Maldives Maritime Agreement,
supra note 34. France and the United Kingdom made a separate joint declaration on
navigation contemporaneously with their 1982 delimitation agreement. United King-
dom-France Shelf Boundary Agreement, supra note 99.
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viewed as a resource or economic factor. The question of using,
or extending, an "historical" boundary (or even a prior modus
vivendi) for maritime delimitation purposes is laden with politi-
cal as well as legal content. 127 In a strict sense, questions of
historic bays or waters frequently may be regarded as baseline
questions.
B. Land Boundaries
In the normal case, a land boundary is better viewed as a
geographic rather than an historic factor. The land boundary
determines the allocation of coastlines from which maritime
jurisdiction extends. In the case of adjacent states, the intersec-
tion of the land boundary with the sea constitutes the starting
point for the maritime boundary. There are, however, some
situations in which the land boundary takes on a broader histor-
ic significance with respect to a maritime boundary.
127. Article 15 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, like
art. 12 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
specifies with respect to delimitation of the territorial sea that the equidistance rule
applicable in the absence of agreement to the contrary "does not apply . . . where it
is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the
territorial sea of the two States in a way which is at variance" therewith. Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516
U.N.T.S. 205. The delimitation rule in Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf specifies that the equidistance rule applies "[i]n the absence of agree-
ment, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances;' there
is no mention of historic title. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 24.
The delimitation rules articulated in Arts. 74 and 83 of the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea with respect to the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
do not address the location of the boundary in the absence of the agreement: they
require that delimitation "be effected by agreement on the basis of international
law . . . in order to achieve an equitable solution," that the States concerned resort
to the dispute settlement procedures provided for in the Convention "[i]f no agree-
ment can be reached within a reasonable period of time," and that pending agree-
ment "the States concerned . . . shall make every effort to enter into provisional
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeop-
ardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement." Article 298(1)(a) permits
either party, at a minimum, to submit a maritime boundary dispute to conciliation.
Article 298(1)(a) permits a party to declare that it does not accept arbitration or
adjudication of disputes "relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving
historic bays or titles," but in that event requires acceptance of submission of the
matter to conciliation at the request of any party to the dispute. See U.N. Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2.
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1. Rivers Flowing into the Sea
One such situation arises in an essentially technical context,
namely where the center or thalweg of a river that flows into the
sea constitutes the land boundary. Either the shore line at the
mouth of the river in the case of a center-line boundary, or the
channel in the case of a thalweg, may change position over time.
Mexico and the U.S. had to deal with this problem in estab-
lishing their territorial sea boundary in the Gulf of Mexico be-
yond the mouth of the Rio Grande.1" The position of the Rio
Grande at its mouth, as indeed in other places, changes over
time. It is evident that the parties attached significant political,
historical, and practical importance to the maintenance of the
Rio Grande as the boundary: in contemporaneous settlements of
outstanding disputes regarding their land boundary, their solu-
tion to the problem was cession of territories that fell on oppo-
site sides of the river and agreement to attempt to stabilize the
course of the river in the future.129 In the case of the maritime
boundary, a fixed point was established somewhat seaward of
the mouth of the Rio Grande. Seaward of that point, a fixed
maritime boundary was established. However, landward of that
point, the boundary will migrate over time, connecting the fixed
point with the center of the mouth of the river.
In the Guinea-Guinea-Bissau arbitration, the tribunal was
faced with a similar problem of linking a fixed maritime bound-
ary with the land boundary, namely the thalweg of the Cajet
River. Noting that the thalweg might migrate, the tribunal be-
gan the fixed boundary seaward of the mouth of the river, and
specified that landward of that point the boundary would extend
in the direction of the thalweg.130
128. Mexico-United States Exchange of Notes, supra note 98.
129. Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio
Grande and the Colorado River as the International Boundary between the United
States and Mexico, Nov. 23, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 371. Mexico-United States Exchange of
Notes, supra note 98; see also Convention for the Solution of the Chamizal Problem,
Aug. 29, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 21, 505 U.N.T.S. 185.
130. Guinea-Guinea-Bissau Award, supra note 33, % 129.
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2. Direction of the Land Boundary
Adjacent states sometimes argue that a maritime boundary
should be established by extending the land boundary in the
same direction out to sea. The territorial sea boundary prolongs
the last segment of the land boundary between Turkey and the
U.S.S.R. in the same direction. 3'
The International Court of Justice rejected the Libyan argu-
ment that the maritime boundary should continue in the north-
ward direction of the land frontier in the Tunisia/Libya
case.'32 In the Gulf of Maine case, the United States argued
that the general orientation of the continental boundary between
the two countries suggested a generally east-west orientation of
the maritime boundary, while Canada argued that the general
orientation of the land boundary in the coastal region between
Maine and New Brunswick suggested a generally north-south
orientation of the maritime boundary. The Chamber appeared
unimpressed by both arguments, and established the orientation
of the maritime boundary seaward of the Gulf of Maine as a
perpendicular to the generally northeast-southwest orientation
of the coast."
3. Lines at Sea
It is not uncommon for treaties dealing with cessions or
allocations of sovereignty over islands or other territory to define
the areas ceded or allocated between those states on the basis of
lines drawn at sea. The essential purpose of those lines is to
provide a convenient reference for determining which islands
and territories are ceded or allocated to a particular party.
Among other things, this approach avoids the need to identify
precisely all islands and other territory ceded.
The question posed is whether those same lines (in light of
131. Turkey-U.S.S.R. Protocol, supra note 96.
132. Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case, supra note 10, 9 85. The Court did
not however identity "the factor of perpendicularity to the coast and the concept of
the prolongation of the general direction of the land boundary" as "relevant criteria
to be taken into account." Id. $ 120.
133. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12) [hereinafter Gulf of Maine Case].
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the precise text of the relevant treaty, the original intent of the
parties'" or subsequent practice, or otherwise as a relevant
historical circumstance) are also to be used as maritime bound-
aries. For newly independent states, in particular, this issue
may be linked to the importance they attach to the principle of
uti possidetis as a means of avoiding boundary disputes and
maintaining stable and peaceful relations.135
In the Guinea-Guinea-Bissau arbitration, after extensive
analysis of the text of the treaty, its negotiating history, and
subsequent practice, the tribunal rejected Guinea's argument
that the line extending far out to sea drawn in an 1866 Franco-
Portuguese treaty dividing their West African territories con-
stituted a maritime boundary as such.'36 It nevertheless used
this line, deeming it a relevant factor and otherwise equitable,
for determining the location of the maritime boundary in a fairly
significant area in the vicinity of the coast up to a point twelve
miles seaward of Guinea's Alcatraz Island.'37 The tribunal
pointed out that use of the seaward portions of the line as a
maritime boundary would aggravate the problem of enclavement
it was trying to find means to solve in the broader context of the
West African coast.
The 1990 U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement expressly identifies the
maritime boundary as the line identifying the areas ceded in the
1867 U.S.-Russia Convention regarding the purchase of Alas-
134. It should be borne in mind that while at least parts of the lines in ques-
tion may be great distances from the nearest land, many of the treaties in question
were concluded at a time when the territorial sea was the only generally accepted
form of coastal state jurisdiction, and prevailing views regarding the maximum per-
missible breath of the territorial sea revolved around the traditional three-mile limit
or little more. On the other hand, this circumstance does not in itself resolve the
question of whether a cession or allocation was so defined as to constitute a limit of
such maritime jurisdiction as might be claimed by a party or permitted by interna-
tional law at the time or in the future.
135. The Solemn of 1964 by the Heads of State and Governments of the Organi-
zation of African Unity honoring existing boundaries at the time of independence is
unquestionably regarded as fundamental by African experts who recognize the chaos
that could result from challenges to the legitimacy of boundaries on grounds such as
their imperial provenance or demographic rationality. It should be noted Guinea-
Bissau unsuccessfully challenged a 1960 maritime boundary agreed to by Portugal
and France (on behalf of Senegal). Guinea-Guinea-Bissau Award, supra note 33; see
also Application of Guinea-Bissau to the I.C.J., 1989, (Aug. 23 Annex).
136. Since the tribunal decided that the treaty did not establish a maritime
boundary as such, it was able to avoid considering the effect of the uti possidetis
principle. Guinea-Guinea-Bissau Award, supra note 33, 85.
137. Guinea-Guinea-Bissau Award, supra note 33, 91 105, 106, 111(a).
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ka."'38 The line drawn in the 1867 Convention is located entire-
ly at sea and extends across the Bering Sea and due north into
the Arctic Ocean.'39 It is the longest single maritime boundary
in the world between two states, and delimits the territorial sea,
the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf beneath
and beyond the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. The agree-
ment includes a transfer by each party to the other of coastal
state jurisdiction beyond the maritime boundary to which the
transferor but not the transferee would otherwise be entitled
under international law.14
There are a number of other situations in which both par-
ties may regard similar lines as constituting their maritime
boundaries. These are not free from uncertainty."' An example
is the following comment from the study of the maritime bound-
ary between Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand:""
The eastern terminus [of the boundary defined in the agree-
ment] is about forty-seven nautical miles from the mouth of
the Pakchan River which marks the boundary between Bur-
ma and Thailand; it is suspected that the line joining this
138. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Boundary Agreement, supra note 91. The text of the 1867
Convention contains a comprehensive cession of all "territory and dominion" east of
the line. Convention Ceding Alaska, Mar. 18/30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539.
139. Some historical features of the 1867 line may be of interest. It was origi-
nally drawn by the Russian Imperial Navy in connection with the Russian proposal
to sell Alaska to the United States. The report of the Chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee to the U.S. Senate in connection with its consideration of the 1867
Convention identifies as one of the benefits of the purchase the rich fisheries re-
sources in extensive relatively shallow areas above what we would now call the
continental shelf.
140. The 1990 agreement followed an exchange of notes in the late 1970s in
which each state indicated that it intended to respect the 1867 line in connection
with its extension of fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. Subsequent to that exchange
of notes, the parties found that they differed as to the proper depiction of the 1867
line and needed to address aspects of its effect. The precise line drawn in the 1990
agreement coincides with the 1867 line where the parties agreed on its depiction
and, in the Bering Sea, is composed of segments all of which lie between or coincide
with the differing depictions of the 1867 line as a loxodromic or a geodetic line.
141. The regional summary report refers to the apparent use in the vicinity of
the adjacent coasts of Malaysia and Thailand of a line drawn on a rough sketch in
the protocol attached to a 1909 treaty which separated the territories of British Ma-
laya from Thailand. The report also refers to the apparent use between Malaysia
and Singapore of the line agreed in 1924 by Britain and the Sultan of Johore to
define the extent of Singapore; that line coincided with the deep channel of Johore
Strait.
142. Burma-India Agreement, supra note 81.
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river mouth to the eastern terminus is the line shown on a
map which was part of the boundary agreement [dividing
islands] between Britain and Thailand dated 30 April and 3
July 1868, when Britain ruled Burma.
An analogous situation is presented by the maritime bound-
ary between Finland and Sweden. Three turning points and one
terminal point of the continental shelf boundary coincide with
points established in the 1921 Convention concerning the non-
fortification and neutralization of the Aland Islands. 1" Howev-
er, subsequent fishing lines drawn by each of the parties do not
use those points.
C. Prior Maritime Boundaries
While widespread assertion and acceptance of coastal state
jurisdiction over the continental shelf generally occurred in the
decade or so following the 1945 Truman Proclamation on the
continental shelf, widespread assertion and acceptance of coastal
state jurisdiction over fisheries, or a more comprehensive exclu-
sive economic zone, extending to 200 miles did not occur for
another thirty years or so, in many cases in conjunction with the
emerging consensus at the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea. Thus, states that established a maritime
boundary beyond the territorial sea for one purpose, for example
delimitation of the continental shelf, may face the question of
whether to use the same boundary to delimit jurisdictions
claimed subsequent to the establishment of the maritime bound-
ary, for example fisheries or exclusive economic zone jurisdic-
tion.
The agreements between Finland and the U.S.S.R. illustrate
an affirmative response to that question. The parties used the
two previously established continental shelf boundaries for fish-
eries delimitation purposes." Subsequently they converted
143. Agreement between Finland and Sweden Concerning the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Bothnia, the Aland Sea and the Northernmost Part
of the Baltic Sea, Sept. 29, 1972, Fin.-Swed., (U.N. Legislative Series) U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/18, 49 (1976). The history can be traced further back to the 1809
Peace Treaty of Fredrikshavn between Russia and Sweden.
144. Agreement between Finland and U.S.S.R. on the Delimitation of the Eco-
nomic Zone and Fishery Zone in the North Eastern Baltic Sea, Feb. 25, 1980, Fin.-
U.S.S.R., 33 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta S.S.S.R. (Communications of the Su-
preme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) 676 (1987).
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those continental shelf and fisheries jurisdiction boundaries into
all-purpose single maritime boundaries, including the exclusive
economic zone." 5  Similarly, Turkey and the U.S.S.R. used
their previously established continental shelf boundary to delim-
it their respective exclusive economic zones." The line drawn
in the historic 1942 seabed delimitation agreement between the
United Kingdom and Venezuela with respect to the Gulf of Paria
has been used, with some technical changes, in the single mari-
time boundaries drawn in the 1989 and 1990 agreements be-
tween Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. 147 On the other
hand, the provisional fisheries surveillance and enforcement line
agreed by Australia and Indonesia, for example, is substantially
different from their earlier continental shelf boundary."
History or prior practice may not alone explain the decision
to use a previous line drawn within the 200-mile zone. That
decision may be related to the recent practice of drawing a sin-
gle maritime boundary for all purposes. Attempts to use differ-
ent lines for different purposes within the zone raise a number
of practical problems of allocation of jurisdiction demonstrated,
for example, by the treatment of "residual jurisdiction" in the
145. Economic Zone, Fishery Zone, and Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Finland
and the North Eastern Baltic Sea, Feb. 5, 1985, Fin.-U.S.S.R., 25 Vedomosti
Verkhovnogo Soveta S.S.S.R. (Communications of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.)
1 (1987).
146. Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones in the Black Sea, Dec. 23,
1986 - Feb. 6, 1987, Turk.-U.S.S.R., T.C. Resmi Gazete No. 19386 (1987) (Turkey-
U.S.S.R.).
147. Treaty between the United Kingdom and the United States of Venezuela
Relating to the Submarine Areas of Gulf Paria, Feb. 26, 1942, Trin. & Tobago-
Venez., Limits in the Seas, No. 11 (1970). Delimitations of Marine and Submarine
Areas, Trin. & Tobago-Venez., G. 0., No. 34645, Apr. 18, 1990 (1991) (Venezuela).
148. Understanding between Indonesia and Australia Concerning Implementation
of a Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Arrangement, Oct. 29, 1981,
Austl.-Indon., (Rep. 6-2(4)), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra
note 20, at 1238. It might be noted that the earlier continental shelf boundary be-
tween Australia and Indonesia in the area, presumably in partial response to Aus-
tralian reliance on the concept of natural prolongation, was influenced by
geomorphological factors. See Australia-Indonesia Timor and Arafura Seabed Agree-
ment, supra note 46. Opinions of the International Court of Justice subsequent to
that time placed substantially less emphasis on the concept of natural prolongation
in continental shelf delimitation. The change in the Court's approach was itself influ-
enced by the fact that the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea included sover-
eign rights over the resources of the seabed and subsoil within the concept of the
200-mile exclusive economic zone and defined the outer limit of the continental shelf
alternatively in terms of natural prolongation or a 200-mile limit.
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Australia-Papua New Guinea agreement. 149
A similar question may be presented where the territorial
sea is extended to twelve miles in areas that were previously
subject to claims of more limited jurisdiction. Some segments of
the territorial sea boundary between France and Italy in the
Straits of Bonifacio follow the alignment of a 1908 fishing delim-
itation agreement.15 The boundary between Poland and Swe-
den in part follows a previous provisional fisheries boundary.15'
Following extension of the territorial sea to twelve miles, France
and the U.K. agreed to modify the status of the boundary in the
Straits of Dover from a continental shelf boundary to a terri-
torial sea boundary.'52
In the Guinea-Bissau-Senegal arbitration, the tribunal, by a
vote of 2-1, agreed with Senegal that the 1960 Franco-Portu-
guese agreement delimiting the territorial sea, contiguous zone,
and continental shelf bound the parties. The President, who
voted in the majority, declared separately that because the 1960
agreement did not delimit the exclusive economic zone, the tri-
bunal should have addressed that delimitation question. Guinea-
Bissau instituted proceedings in the International Court of Jus-
tice to void the award. The Court declined to do so." 3
An interesting variant of this issue involves the treatment
of essentially the same question in successive maritime bound-
ary agreements with different states. Thus, for example, the
issue of reduced effect for Gotland was resolved between Poland
and Sweden on the same basis that it was previously resolved
between Sweden and the U.S.S.R., namely seventy-five percent
effect." The North Sea Continental Shelf cases nevertheless
provide ample evidence of the limits of any strategy designed to
impose such a result on a reluctant party.
149. See discussion preceding supra note 109.
150. Italy-France Convention, supra note 109.
151. Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf and the Fishery
Zones, Feb. 10, 1989, Pol.-Swed., Regeringens Proposition 1988/89:97 (Swed.) [herein-
after Continental Shelf and Fishery Zones Agreement].
152. Agreement on the Territorial Sea Boundary in the Straits of Dover, Nov. 2,
1988, Fr.-U.K., 1989 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 1732).
153. Award of Arbitral Tribunal (Guinea-Bissau), 1989 (July 31), Application of
Guinea-Bissau to the I.C.J., 1989, (Aug. 23 Annex); Case Concerning the Arbitral
Award (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) 1989 (July 31), 1990 I.C.J. 64 (Request for Indica-
tion of Provisional Measures Order).
154. Continental Shelf and Fishery Zones Agreement, supra note 151.
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D. Informal or De Facto Lines
In some instances, an informal or de facto line used by both
parties may become the basis for a maritime boundary. The
maritime boundary agreed between Abu Dhabi and Dubai in
1965 was initially established as an administrative frontier for
oil concession purposes in 1951.15 In the Tunisia/Libya case,
the International Court of Justice used a 1919 line drawn by
Italian authorities when they were in control of Libya, noting
that this was the de facto line respected by the parties as divid-
ing their oil concessions.15
Determining the political or juridical effect of informal or de
facto lines poses a delicate problem. It is desirable to encourage
parties that are unable to reach agreement on a maritime
boundary for the time being to find some interim modus viven-
di."'57 Fears that a modus vivendi may, for political or juridical
reasons, evolve into a permanent boundary or boundary regime
may limit the ability of the parties to find means to control the
scope and intensity of their dispute.'58
E. Unilateral Claims
Whatever their effect on baselines used for purposes of mea-
suring equidistant lines 59 - which appears to be scant -
there is no evidence that the limits of historic claims determine
the location of modern maritime boundaries as such. In the
Tunisia/Libya case, the International Court of Justice noted the
distinction between historic rights or waters and rights over the
continental shelf which arise ipso facto and ab initio."'5 It re-
155. Abu Dhabi-Dubai Offshore Boundary Agreement, supra note 79.
156. Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case, supra note 10, '% 93-96, 117, 120. It
should be noted that this line is roughly perpendicular to the coast at the land
boundary.
157. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea supra note 2, common 3,
arts. 74, 83 (1983).
158. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea supra note 2, arts. 74 and 83
(specifying that provisional arrangements "shall be without prejudice to the final
delimitation").
159. See generally Louis B. Sohn, Baseline Considerations, in INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 20.
160. Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case, supra note 10, 100.
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jected use of a unilateral Tunisian fishing line and noted that
the Libyan northward line on its official petroleum regulation
map was insufficient even to constitute a formal claim.'61
In connection with the influence of geomorphology in the
Australia-Indonesia continental shelf boundary, one might note
the earlier reference to a 100-fathom limit in the Australian
Pearl Fisheries Act of 1952-53, as well as the limits specified in
the 1967 continental shelf legislation in Australia dealing with
the problem of competing state and federal assertions of jurisdic-
tion. 2 Even if these references were not designed to deal with
delimitation, but only with the general question of the definition
and seaward limit of the continental shelf,' it is possible that
the legislation, including the state-federal settlement, added to
the political pressure on the Australian government to achieve a
delimitation rooted in geology or geomorphology.
It is interesting to note that the agreement between India
and Sri Lanka establishing a maritime boundary in Palk Strait
and Bay deals with an area that the parties both regarded as
historic waters originally appertaining to the United Kingdom
prior to the independence of the two states concerned. The
agreement provides for reciprocal recognition of traditional
rights in that area.'
F. Prior Seabed Concessions
Related to the question of unilateral claims, but distinguish-
able therefrom, is the problem posed by prior authorizations by
a state for exploration or exploitation of the seabed. Absent
acceptance or some adequate manifestation of acquiescence by
the neighboring state concerned, unilateral seabed concessions
do not establish maritime boundaries. The problem of private
investment and expectations based on such authorizations nev-
ertheless persists. The state that issued the authorizations may
161. Id. 9 92.
162. Australia-Indonesia Timor and Arafura Seabed Agreement, supra note 46.
163. See 4 Whiteman DIG. OF INT'L. L. at 757, 758. Australian authorities were
doubtless aware that the press release accompanying the 1945 Truman Proclamation
on the continental shelf referred to the continental shelf as extending to a depth of
approximately 100 fathoms. The Australian legislation in question was enacted prior
to the decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, supra note 11.
164. India-Sri-Lanka Agreement, supra note 82.
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be responding to a variety of factors, including political pressure
from its licensees, fear of liability to its licensees, or general
considerations of fairness.
Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany adjusted the
line designed to implement the Court's decision in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases so as to permit some existing Danish
licensees to remain on the Danish continental shelf."5 Abu
Dhabi and Qatar agreed to share ownership and revenues from
a disputed field, but under the existing Abu Dhabi concession
agreement. 6' The agreement between Australia and Papua
New Guinea provides for certain protections under the laws of
Papua New Guinea for holders of Australian exploration per-
mits.'6
G. Traditional Fisheries
There are some cases where traditional fisheries might be
regarded as an historic factor influencing the boundary agree-
ment. Since some of these arrangements involve artisanal fisher-
ies by indigenous peoples who are culturally or ethnically dis-
tinct or at least geographically isolated from the general popula-
tions of the states concerned, a political (if not juridical) factor
relating to the protection of such peoples may also be discerned.
The most elaborate arrangement is to be found in the agree-
ment between Australia and Papua New Guinea. It establishes a
Protected Zone in the Torres Strait area providing for the con-
tinuation not only of traditional fishing but other traditional
activities. Paragraph 3 of Article 10 provides:
The principal purpose of the Parties in establishing the Pro-
tected Zone, and in determining its . . . boundaries, is to ac-
165. North Sea Continental Shelf (Den.-F.R.G.) 1969 I.C.J. 81 (Feb. 20) (separate
opinion of Jessup, J.) (suggesting some arrangement in this regard).
166. Agreement on Settlement of Maritime Boundary Lines and Sovereign Rights
over Islands between Qatar and Abu Dhabi, Mar. 20, 1969, Qatar-U.A.E., (U.N.
Legislative Series) U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16 (1974). The agreement between
Sharjah and Iran regarding Abu Masa (claimed by both) provides that offshore pe-
troleum will continue to be produced by Sharjah's concessionaire with governmental
revenues being shared equally by the parties. See Agreement on Seabed Boundary
between the Rulers of Sharjah and Umm al Qaywayn, 1964, Sharjah-Umm al
Qaywayn, I Can. Annex 99 (1983).
167. Australia-Papua New Guinea Treaty, supra note 4.
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knowledge and protect the traditional way of life and liveli-
hood of the traditional inhabitants including their traditional
fishing and free movement.
Pursuant to Article 11, "each Party shall continue to permit
free movement and the performance of lawful traditional activi-
ties in and in the vicinity of the Protected Zone by the tradition-
al inhabitants of the other Party."'"
Prior settlement of issues related to the control of Indone-
sian traditional fishing apparently facilitated the negotiation of
the provisional fisheries enforcement line between Australia and
Indonesia."9 In the case of the India-Sri Lanka boundary in
the Gulf of Manaar and Bay of Bengal, Sri Lankan claims of his-
toric fishing rights in Wedge Bank did not alter the location of
the line, but did result in agreement on respect for Sri Lankan
fishing rights for three years and a Sri Lankan right to purchase
fish thereafter. 7 '
In North America, the negotiation of a maritime boundary
was regarded as part of a larger attempt to settle historic
French rights to fish off Canada."' On the other hand, United
States efforts to demonstrate historic fishing patterns and other
historic activities in support of its position that it should receive
all of Georges Bank did not succeed in the Gulf of Maine case. It
should be noted, however, that the line drawn by the Chamber
was more favorable to the United States than a hypothetical
equidistant line, and that the Chamber implied that a line total-
ly unresponsive to Canadian fisheries activities in the northeast-
ern part of the bank would not be equitable.'72
168. Id.
169. Provisional Fisheries Surveillance, supra note 17.
170. Agreement between India and Sri Lanka on the Maritime Boundary be-
tween the Two Countries in the Gulf of Manaar and the Bay of Bengal, Mar. 23,
1976, India-Sri Lanka, (U.N. Legislative Series) U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19 (1980).
171. Agreement between Canada and France Concerning Mutual Fishing Rela-
tions off the Atlantic Coast of Canada, Mar. 27, 1972, Can.-Fr., 862 U.N.T.S. 209
(1973).
172. Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 133, 237-38; Treaty between Canada
and United States to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Mar. 29, 1979, Can.-U.S., 1984 I.C.J.
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V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that political factors influence the ques-
tion of whether, and if so when, a maritime boundary will be
negotiated or submitted to a tribunal for determination. The
question of timing alone may influence the location of the bound-
ary in response to an evolving jurisprudence in the field of mari-
time boundaries and changes in the regimes of the law of the
sea more generally.
It is often difficult to demonstrate what particular influence
political factors have on the precise location of a specific bound-
ary. In this regard, however, it must be borne in mind that the
interests governments seek to protect are frequently the result
of a political analysis that may or may not reflect a hypothetical
"objective" analysis of those interests. A government's reasons
for taking into account its neighbor's interests and perceptions
in the context of a negotiated boundary are, at least in some
respects, different in kind and degree from its reasons for doing
so in its presentations before a tribunal.
There is no direct evidence that tribunals take political
factors as such into account in determining maritime bound-
aries. It can be argued that the broader regional analysis of the
problem faced by the tribunal in the Guinea-Guinea-Bissau
arbitration was to some, widely regarded as felicitous, degree
"political." This author would be among those who believe the
tribunal was, in effect, sensitive to the broader principles and
purposes of the U.N. Charter and the OAU Charter in seeking
means to promote peaceful relations among states.
The fact that adjudicated or arbitrated maritime boundaries
tend to fall between those proposed by the parties may or may
not reflect a tendency to strike a compromise. It can be argued
that such results are inevitable where parties take maximum or
extreme positions. At all events, the issue is merely one aspect
of the broader question of whether arbitrators are prone to seek
compromise results and, if so, whether that tendency is properly
characterized as political.
Security factors are most prominent in dealing with mari-
time boundaries close to the coast, but they have influenced
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some boundary arrangements beyond the territorial sea. The
evidence that states take security factors into account in negoti-
ating maritime boundaries is probably insufficient to indicate
the extent to which this is in fact done. In many situations secu-
rity interests and other interests (such as commercial navigation
or resource interests) coincide, and in many situations a variety
of maritime boundaries may accommodate perceived security
interests.
While states have raised security interests in arbitrations or
adjudications, the arguments appear to have had different ef-
fects. In the Libya/Malta and Guinea-Guinea-Bissau cases, the
tribunals tested the lines arrived at for other reasons against
the coastal security concerns raised by the parties and found
them sufficient. In the Anglo-French arbitration, the result was
arguably responsive to France's security concerns about access
in the English Channel. In the Gulf of Maine case, the United
States, having noted that an equidistant line would extend as
far south as Philadelphia, outlined its perception of Canadian
tendencies to expand coastal state jurisdiction both geographi-
cally and functionally; the point had no explicit effect on the
Chamber's analysis.
Historical factors can influence both negotiated and adjudi-
cated boundaries. The most significant effect occurs in the use of
lines primarily drawn for some other purpose, such as delimita-
tion of a different form of maritime jurisdiction or allocation or
cession of islands and other land territory. There is evidence of
some tendency to use continental shelf boundaries to delimit
fisheries or exclusive economic zones. On the whole, however,
there is no consistent pattern. Each case must be examined
closely in terms of the legal significance of the historical factor
as well as the political, security, geographic, and economic im-
pact of taking it into account or failing to do so.
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